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Abstract 
FORR (For the Right Reasons) is an architecture for learning and problem solving that inte- 
grates a possibly incomplete and overlapping set of solution methods to address complex problems. 
Each method, although it represents some facet of domain expertise, may vary in reliability and 
speed. The principal contribution of this paper is the extension of FORR to include situation-based 
behavior (the serial testing of known, triggered techniques for problem solving in a domain) with 
reactivity and heuristic reasoning. FORR categorizes methods as reactive, heuristic, or situation- 
based, and addresses problem solving with one category of methods at a time. A hierarchical 
reasoner first has the opportunity to react correctly. If no ready reaction is computed, the reasoner 
activates a set of reactive triggers for time-limited search procedures tailored to specific situations. 
If they, too, fail to produce a response, the reasoner resorts to collaboration among heuristic 
rationales. All three components reference knowledge learned from experience. In a series of 
experiments, this architecture is shown to be effective and efficient. Ablation experiments demon- 
strate how each component plays an important role in problem solving. Additional contributions 
of this paper include a FORR-based, pragmatic, cognitively plausible approach to navigation with 
learned heuristic approximations that describe two-dimensional territory and travel experience 
through it, and a careful study of how situation-based behavior, reactivity, and heuristics interact 
there. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the resultant system is both effective and efficient, 
and guidelines for generalization to other domains are provided. @ 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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Naive geographic reasoning is probably the most common and basic form 
of human intelligence-Egenhofer & Mark, 1995 
When confronted with an intractable search space, people employ a variety of devices to 
make what they hope will be expert decisions. Some of this behavior is automatic; certain 
perceptions of the world trigger action without conscious reasoning. AI researchers 
have modeled this automaticity with reactive systems. Other portions of this behavior 
are heuristic; limitedly rational reasoning principles are applied in some combination. 
There is, however, another important mechanism people use, a kind of restricted search. 
Situation-based behavior is the serial testing of known, triggered techniques for problem 
solving in a domain. The principal contribution of this paper is the extension of FORR 
(For the Right Reasons), an architecture for learning and problem solving, so that 
it integrates situation-based behavior with reactivity and heuristic reasoning. To solve 
a complex problem, FORR structures a possibly incomplete and overlapping set of 
heuristic solution methods. Each method, although it represents some facet of domain 
expertise, may vary in reliability and speed. Additional contributions of this paper include 
a pragmatic, cognitively plausible approach to navigation with FORR; a careful study 
of how situation-based behavior, reactivity, and heuristics interact there; and empirical 
evidence that the resultant system is both effective and efficient. 
Consider first how reactivity, situation-based behavior, and heuristics would behave 
separately on a path-finding example. In the grid world studied here, the robot knows 
its own coordinates and those of the goal. (Other kinds of grid worlds could be treated 
similarly.) The robot has no map; it can “see” only to the nearest obstruction in four 
orthogonal directions, and a decision constitutes a move in a straight line to any visible 
location, Fig. 1 shows a goal at (9,6) and three possible locations for a robot, with 
the legal moves from RI striped. Unilateral application of reactivity, situation-based 
behavior, or heuristics would encounter difficulties here. Without record of its recent 
experience and the ability to learn, a purely reactive system could become mired in local 
cyclic behaviors. Without every relevant decision-making rule, a purely heuristic system 
could err, resorting to either random choice or search when no heuristic was applicable. 
And without efficient decision making, a purely situation-based system would incur 
heavy search costs. 
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Fig. I. Robot R seeks to move to goal G. 
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In contrast, FORR strikes an economical balance among reactivity, situation-based 
behavior, and heuristics. Rather than exhaustively deliberate on a complete model of the 
world, FORR responds in a variety of efficient ways to a partial, feature-based model. 
As a three-tiered architecture, it gives priority first to correct reactions, then to situation- 
based behaviors, and finally to heuristics, all with reference to the model learned during 
problem solving. Reactivity is given top priority because it is an inexpensive way to 
make the right obvious decisions and to avoid the wrong obvious ones. Although it is 
costly, situation-based behavior relies upon triggers to justify the appropriate expenditure 
of computational cycles on search, and relies upon restricted routines to search in a very 
limited manner. Heuristics thus become a last, albeit frequent, resort, applied when the 
right decision is not obvious and the problem solver cannot justify restricted search in 
the partial model. 
Consider how FORR would deal with each of the robot locations in Fig. 1. If a robot 
at RI contemplated a move to (7,5), but had been there before and remembered that 
it was a dead-end, a correct reaction would be to eliminate that move from any further 
consideration. Now consider a robot at R2 with no immediate reactions. If it had made 
little progress on its task, and recognized that it was aligned with the goal but there 
was an intervening obstruction, FORR could activate a time-limited search algorithm to 
circumnavigate that obstruction. If the search algorithm were able to realign the robot 
with the goal, say at (9,9) with the path 
((636) (697) (7,7) (798) (878) (839) (939)) 
then that entire path would be proposed and executed as a way of addressing the 
recognized situation. Finally, consider a robot at R3, one that has no immediate reactions 
and does not recognize any particular situation. Aligning the robot with the goal is 
generally a good heuristic, so (6,6) might be a good choice. Then again, if the robot is 
having difficulty on the trip, trying a location it has not yet visited, say (4,8) or (6,5), 
might be helpful. Of course, large steps speed travel, so (3, S), (6,3), and (8,8) might 
be good choices. Since two of those choices are in the general direction of the goal, a 
long-step heuristic might value them more highly. Achieving a consensus from heuristics 
such as these is nontrivial. (Happily, the dilemma at R3 will be resolved in Section 4.) 
Pragmatic navigation, as implemented here by FORR, aspires to provide robust, 
competent performance in two-dimensional space, performance that improves across 
time and is resilient to changes in origin and destination. Instead of pre-engineered 
expertise for a particular territory, a pragmatic navigator learns its way around a new 
territory from a series of trips through the territory, trips whose origins and destinations 
differ. Just as a person who travels efficiently through a campus does not retain a 
detailed description of each trip or remember the location of each tree and rock, a 
pragmatic navigator ignores much travel history and many topographical details. Instead 
of a detailed map, pragmatic navigation relies upon features that support efficient travel 
or make it more difficult, such as a door into a room or an extended wall. In a new 
territory, a pragmatic navigator initially performs as a competent novice, and then, as it 
learns features of the territory from traveling there, it uses that knowledge to improve 
its performance. As envisioned here, most features are heuristic rather than absolutely 
accurate; they are useful approximations that describe a territory and travel experience 
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Fig. 2. A problem and its solution in a maze 
through it. Such representation deliberately sacrifices detail in exchange for efficient 
storage, retrieval, and computation. 
It is the thesis of this work that expert navigation through unmapped territory can 
be achieved as the integration of correct reactions, situation-based behavior, and care- 
fully balanced heuristics, many of which reference features learned about the territory 
during travel there. This approach works because it appropriately allocates control and 
responds to context, both in a cognitively plausible way. The first section of this paper 
frames navigation as a set of travel tasks for a perceptually-limited agent in unknown 
territory, explains why traditional AI search algorithms find that so difficult, and pro- 
poses pragmatic navigation as an alternative. The second section describes FORR, the 
underlying architecture for learning and problem solving that balances search, reactivity, 
and heuristics. Section 3 identifies territory features for pragmatic navigation and how 
they can be learned. Section 4 summarizes navigation principles for decision making, 
and offers examples of how FORR coordinates those navigation principles with learned 
knowledge. Section 5 formulates and reports on a series of experiments that demonstrate 
the strengths of pragmatic navigation and identify the FORR components responsible for 
its performance. Section 6 provides a full discussion of the results, including guidelines 
for applying these ideas in other domains. The final sections address related and future 
work. Algorithmic details are reserved to the Appendix. 
1. The task and an approach 
The pragmatic navigation task was first suggested as a problem that would challenge 
the power of search algorithms [ 251. The robot’s world is a maze, a discrete, rectangular 
grid with external walls and internal obstructions like the 14 x 14 maze that is 30% 
obstructed in Fig. 2. (All the examples in this paper are taken from actual runs; the 
experiments themselves are on substantially larger mazes than this one.) A lacufion 
(r, c) in a maze is the position in the rth row and cth column, addressed as if it were an 
array. A problem is to travel from an initial robot location R to some goal location G in 
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a sequence of legal moves, that is, to find a (not necessarily optimal) path to the goal. 
In Fig. 2 the problem is to travel from (9,s) to ( 1, 14). In any state, the robot senses 
only its own coordinates, the coordinates of the goal, the dimensions of the maze, and 
the distance north, south, east, and west to the nearest obstruction or to the goal. The 
robot does not sense while moving, only before a move. The robot also remembers any 
useful knowledge acquired in previous trips through this maze. (This domain is similar 
to privet-hedge mazes such as the one grown for royalty at Hampton Court, and to the 
computer game Maze Wars.) The robot knows the path it has thus far traversed in the 
current problem, but it is not given, and does not construct, an explicit, detailed map of 
the maze like the one in Fig. 2. Rather, it learns features of that map as described in 
Section 3. As the problem level increases, this task, even with a map, is nontrivial. 
Intuitively, a legal move passes through any number of unobstructed locations in a 
vertical or horizontal line. More formally, a legal move is a transition from a state where 
the robot is at (r, c) to one where it is at (r’,c’) such that exactly one of the foilowing 
is true: 
l r=r’,c<c’andunobstructed(r,c+I),...,(r,c’), 
l r=r’,c>C’andunobstructed(r,c-l),...,(r,c’), 
l c=c’,r<r’andunobstructed(r+I,c),...,(r’,c), 
l c=c’, r>r’andunobstructed (r- l,c),...,(r’,c). 
The robot in Fig. 2 has 1 I legal moves: north to (7,8) and (8,8), east to (9,9) 
through (9, 14), south to ( 10,8), and west to (9,6) and (9,7). A problem is solvable 
if and only if there exists some path 
(R = lock nzovel loq . . loci-i nzove; lot; . . loc,_i movep lot,, = G) 
such that I?iove; is a legal move from Ioc;-i to loci for 1 < i < p. The level ofdifficulzj~ 
of a solvable problem is the minimum value of p for which there is a solution, that is, the 
minimum number of legal moves with which the robot can reach the goal. (Effectively, 
the level of difficulty of a problem is one more than the minimum number of left or 
right turns the robot must make to reach the goal.) Note that this is different from the 
Manhattan distance from R to G. Fig. 2 is a level-6 problem; one six-move solution for 
it, with Manhattan distance 16, is indicated there: 
((9,8) (9,13) (4,13) (4,12) (2712) (2314) (I, 14)). 
Interchanging the robot and the goal produces another problem at the same level. The 
heading of the task is the subset of {north, east, south, west} that describes the direction 
from R to G. The heading of the task in Fig. 2 is {north,east}. 
This task has several performance criteria. The robot is expected to solve multiple 
problems in the same maze. Lower-level problems should be easier to solve. The robot 
is expected to perform quickly. Speed can be measured as elapsed computation time, 
number of decisions, or path length (Manhattan distance) traveled. The robot is also 
expected to perform efficiently. Efficiency can be measured as the number of distinct 
locations visited or the percentage of repeated locations in a path. Finally, the robot 
is expected to learn; its performance should improve with experience. (There is an 
important distinction here between the number of decisions and number of moves. As 
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described below, the system does some search that may not be part of the problem 
solution but consumes resources. Thus, a move appears in the solution path, while 
a decision is a step taken during problem solving, whether or not it appears in the 
solution.) 
As Section 5 demonstrates, the task formulated above is not amenable to traditional 
AI techniques. Depth-first search requires substantial backtracking; its paths are long 
and repetitive. Breadth-first search visits too many nodes; on most hard problems it 
approaches exhaustive search while it visits a high proportion of nodes in the search 
space and maintains a very large structure for open paths. Means-ends analysis is 
inapplicable because it requires knowledge about the vicinity of the goal to reason 
backwards. Best-first search with a “sensible” evaluation function, such as Euclidean 
distance to the goal, is easily misled by deceptive problems where proximity is not a 
valid indicator of progress. (The goal might be hidden behind a long wall so that the 
robot must move away from the goal to reach it eventually. For example, placing the 
robot at (9,4) and the goal at (8,5) in Fig. 2 produces a deceptive level-6 problem.) 
For a large maze, explicit search would be extremely inefficient, perhaps intractable. 
With FORR, pragmatic navigation offers an alternative. 
2. The underlying architecture 
FORR is a problem-solving and learning architecture that models the transition from 
general expertise to specific expertise, and capitalizes on methods that people use [ lo]. 
FORR approaches problem solving as a sequence of reasonable decisions. A tusk is a 
problem-solving experience where a sequence of moves is intended to reach a desired 
state, such as the robot moving from R to G in Fig. 2. A problem class is a set of related 
tasks, such as mazes that simulate furnished rooms or mazes that simulate office suites. 
A domain is a set of related problem classes, such as grid-world mazes. A FORR-based 
system begins with a domain and some domain-specific but problem-class-independent 
knowledge, such as “avoid dead-ends”. With task experience, a FORR-based program 
gradually acquires useful knowledge, problem-class-specific data that is potentially useful 
and probably correct. This useful knowledge, such as dead-ends in a particular maze, 
should enhance the performance of a FORR-based system. 
Although most useful knowledge is tailored to a specific domain, there are broadly 
applicable useful knowledge items that FORR provides and learns by default. Those 
relevant to pragmatic navigation are calculated after each task. Average task length is 
the number of moves made. Total learning experiences is the number of tasks attempted. 
Openings, stored as a tree, are the first x% of the moves recorded for a task. (Throughout 
this paper terms such as “few ” “recent”, or “x%” indicate parameters that are preset by , 
the user. A full listing of the parameter values used in the experiments described here 
appears in the Appendix.) 
FORR’s three-tier hierarchical model of the reasoning process is shown in Fig. 3. An 
Advisor is a domain-specific but problem-class-independent, decision-making rationale, 
such as “get closer to your destination”. Each Advisor is a “right reason”, implemented 
as a time-limited procedure. Input to each Advisor is the current state of the world, 
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Fig. 3. How FORR makes decisions. 
the current permissible actions from that state, and any learned useful knowledge about 
the current problem class. Each Advisor outputs any number of comments that support 
or discourage permissible actians. A comment lists the Advisor, the actian commented 
upon, and a strength, an integer in [0, lo] that measures the intensity and direction 
of the Advisor’s opinion. (Strengths above 5 are construed as support, below 5 as 
opposition.) Although there are no constraints on the nature of the comment-generating 
procedures themselves, a FORR-based system is inrended to sense the current state of 
the world and respond with a rapid computation, that is, to avoid extensive search. 
Tier-l Advisors sense the current state of the world and what they know about the 
problem class; if they make a decision, it is fast and correct. They are consulted in a 
predetermined, fixed order. Each Advisor may have the authority to make a decision 
alone or to eliminate a legal action from any further consideration. Tier-l Advisors are 
reactive and reference only correct useful knowledge. An important tier-l Advisor in a 
FORR-based navigator would be “if you see the goal directly ahead, go to it”. Only 
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when the first tier of a FORR-based system fails to make a decision does control default 
to the next tier. Tier 1 is like the sense-compute-execute loop of a carefully constructed 
and perfectly accurate reactive system. 
Tier-3 Advisors, in contrast, are not necessarily correct in the full context of the state 
space. Each of them embodies a heuristic, specialized view of reality that can make a 
plausible argument for or against one or more actions. Tier-3 Advisors are reactive too, 
but far less trustworthy, because neither their reasoning process nor the useful knowledge 
on which they rely is guaranteed correct. Once control is relegated to tier 3, all tier-3 
Advisors have an opportunity to comment before any choice is made. The decision 
they arrive at is the action with highest total strength. In a FORR-based navigator, a 
good tier-3 Advisor would be “minimize your distance to the goal”. Although a tier-3 
Advisor is reminiscent of a heuristic rule in an expert system or a term in an evaluation 
function for a search algorithm, there are two important differences. First, because a tier- 
3 Advisor may rely on useful knowledge, its reactions to the same state may change with 
experience. Second, a tier-3 Advisor may have an inappropriate (incorrect or irrelevant) 
perspective for a particular problem class, and FORR may learn not only to disregard it, 
but also learn to refuse to allocate computational resources to it. As a result, appropriate 
control for decision making in tier 3 is neither obvious nor trivial. Further details appear 
with an example in Sections 4 and 5. 
As the results in Section 5 indicate, tiers 1 and 3 alone do not solve the most difficult 
problems quickly and reliably enough; some search is necessary. FORR implements 
certain time-limited, situation-based searches with the Advisors of tier 2. Situation-based 
behavior is based upon psychologists’ reports about human experts in resource-limited 
situations [ 231. For example, an emergency rescue team is called to the scene of an 
attempted suicide, where a person dangles from a sign after jumping from a highway 
overpass. Time is limited and the person is semiconscious. During debriefing after a 
successful rescue, the commander of the team describes how they immediately secured 
the semiconscious woman’s arms and legs, but then needed to lift her to safety. He 
mentally retrieved, instantiated, and tested four devices that could hold her while the 
team lifted, one device at a time. When a device failed in his mental simulation, he ran 
the next. When the fourth scenario ran several times in simulation without an apparent 
flaw, he began to execute it in the real world. Klein and Calderwood describe the 
predominance of this situation-based behavior in 32 such incidents, and cite additional 
evidence from studies of army commanders, business executives, juries in deliberation, 
judges setting bail, highway engineers, and nuclear power plant operators [23]. Its 
key features, for the purposes of this discussion, are that a situation triggers a set of 
procedural responses, not solutions, and that those responses are not tested in parallel. 
Each tier-2 Advisor has a reactive trigger and a procedure that generates and tests a 
highly-constrained set of possible solution fragments. A solution fragment emerges from 
a tier-2 Advisor as a sequence of decisions, rather than a single reactive one, a digression 
from the “sense-compute-execute” loop. A tier-2 Advisor triggers when it recognizes 
that its method may be directly related to the current situation, for example, when the 
robot is aligned with the goal but there is an intervening wall. Execution of a tier-2 
Advisor instantiates and tests one or more possible solution fragments, for example, 
paths to circumnavigate the intervening wall. Tier 2 is prioritized like tier 1, but lacks 
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any guarantee of correctness. Until one of them produces a solution fragment, each 
tier-2 Advisor that triggers is ceded control and given limited time to develop a solution 
fragment. Once some tier-2 Advisor constructs a solution fragment, that sequence is 
executed (one move at a time, subject to override from tier 1) and then, regardless of 
the outcome, control is returned to tier 1. Decisions during search are charged to the 
robot, whether or not any fragment step becomes a move because it is recommended 
by the Advisor as a result of the search. If no tier-2 Advisor triggers or produces a 
sequence of recommended steps, tier 3 will make the decision. 
FORR is implemented in Common Lisp. To apply FORR to a domain, one specifies the 
domain, its problem classes, its useful knowledge, and procedures to learn it. Pragmatic 
navigation is implemented as the FORR-based system Ariudne. (Ariadne, daughter of 
King Minos of Crete, told Theseus how to find his way through the labyrinth that 
protected a great treasure.) The next two sections detail Ariadne’s useful knowledge as 
a set of features for two-dimensional space, and sketch Ariadne’s Advisors, navigation 
principles for path finding. 
3. Learning to represent territory 
Instead of a map, pragmatic navigation relies upon two kinds of features to describe a 
territory: those that support efficient travel cfacilitutors) and those make it more difficult 
(obsrructors). These features constitute Ariadne’s useful knowledge, and are learned 
for a specific problem class from experience. Although it may be approximate, useful 
knowledge in FORR is expected to enhance performance. Other than the default items 
described in the preceding section, each kind of useful knowledge in a FORR-based 
program must be prespecified by the system designer, including its learning algorithm, 
learning time limit, and learnin, 0 schedule (after a decision, a task, or a set of tasks). 
This section describes what Ariadne learns, when it learns, and how it does so. 
3. I. Facilitators 
Ariadne identifies three kinds of facilitators: gates, bases, and corners. A gate has, in 
theory, the ability to provide a transition from one large segment of space to another. A 
base repeatedly appears as a counter-intuitive choice in successful paths. A corner offers 
the possibility of a new direction. 
Since it knows the dimensions of the maze, Ariadne can calculate quadrants. A gate 
is a location that offers a transition from one quadrant of the maze to another. After each 
move, Ariadne tests whether its quadrant has changed, that is, if it has moved through a 
gate. If so, the robot’s current location is learned as a gate between the current quadrant 
and the previous one. A gate may not always be helpful; for example, (8, 10) is a gate 
between quadrants 3 and 4 in Fig. 4, but it offers access to little of quadrant 3. Each 
gate is stored with its exterzf (rectangular approximation of the locations from which it 
can be reached) in a hash table whose key is the sorted pair of quadrant numbers. The 
extent of (8, 10) in Fig. 4, for example, is the rectangle with vertices (6, lo), (9, lo), 
(9, S), and (6,5). Ariadne only learns the gates it visits, so many locations in Fig. 4 
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Fig. S. (a) A solution path and the bases that arise from it. (b) A plan for a task formulated from learned 
bases. 
that satisfy the definition of gate were not learned and are not marked. For example, 
during some trip, the robot moved into (14, 10) from quadrant 3, and therefore learned 
(14, IO) as a gate. Although (14,9) is also a gate, it was never experienced as such, 
and therefore was not learned as a gate. (That position is, however, identified below 
as another kind of facilitator.) The subdivision of the maze into only four areas (the 
quadrants) was deliberate. Specifying II areas produces as many as ,,CZ gate categories 
to manage, while fewer areas provide too little transition information. 
A base is a location in a maze that appears to have been a key to a successful 
path. In the author’s home town, people regularly give directions beginning “First you 
go to the Claremont Diner.” Although it served memorable cheesecake, the Claremont 
Diner burned down 15 years ago, and there is nothing particularly significant about 
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the car dealership that has replaced it. What is significant is that the diner was at a 
location that affords ready (not necessarily shortest path) access to other locations in 
a IO-mile radius. A base is such a location. Bases are learned after a successful task; 
the algorithm first corrects the path to eliminate loops and unnecessary digressions. A 
base is a location in that corrected path that was not in the heading from R to G. A 
base is not a dead-end or G itself, and solution fragments constructed by tier-2 Advisors 
that circumvent walls contribute only their most extreme positions opposite the original 
headings. Bases are stored in a hash table with theirfrequency (the number of times they 
have been identified in different problems). The bases learned from one solution path 
are circled in Fig. 5(a), where the heading was {north} and the eastern-most corners 
became bases. 
Bases facilitate some primitive, high-level planning for Ariadne’s decision making. 
A plan in Ariadne is a sequence (ba bi 62 . . . b;_l b; b;+l . . . 6, b,+l) where bo is the 
robot’s current location, b,,+I is the goal, b; is a base for i = 1,. . . ,n, bi is aligned 
vertically or horizontally with b;+l, and either b;_l is closer to bo than b; is, or else bi+l 
is closer to G than b; is. Plans are constructed from bidirectional search on aligned bases, 
with preference for bases of higher frequency, as if there were no obstructions. A plan 
fails when the robot is at some bi and there is an intervening obstruction that prevents 
its move to b;+,. An example of a plan Ariadne formulated for a task is shown in 
Fig, 5 (b) , where the bases learned after 20 level-6 tasks in the same maze are indicated 
by their frequency values. In Fig. 5(b), some bases, such as (14,5) and (14,9) are the 
keys to the only route between the eastern and western portions of the maze. Others, 
such as (7, 13) and (9,9) lie at important intersections, like the Claremont Diner. 
A corridor is a passageway of width one that either has a single exit (a dead-end) 
or is a hallway. A yiye is a straight hallway, that is, its endpoints lie in the same row 
or the same column. In Fig. 6, there is a hallway from (13,5) to (14,B) and a pipe 
from ( 14, 10) to ( 14, 1 I ) . Some pipes offer a view of the space after their far end. For 
example, from (14,9) in Fig. 6 the robot can move not only to the ends of the pipe 
from (14,lO) to (14, 1 I), but also beyond it to (14,12). Other pipes do not offer a 
view of the space after their far end, but since a pipe is not a dead-end, that promises 
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a turn in some other direction. For example, from (4, 10) in Fig. 6 the robot can see 
both ends of the (length one) pipe at (4, 13) but not beyond it; that promises a turn at 
the far end. Such a turn-promising far end of a pipe is called a corner. A corner can 
be helpful when the move to it is orthogonal to a direction in which the robot actually 
seeks to travel. If, for example, the robot were located at (4,lO) in Fig. 6 and the goal 
were to the south, moving east to the known corner at (4, 13) promises the ability to 
travel either north or south. A corridor is learned when, from the current state, the robot 
has only one or two moves. The two endpoints of a corridor serve as the keys to a hash 
table which also indicates whether or not they are for a dead-end. Corridors are enlarged 
and merged together as necessary. Like gates, only corridors that Ariadne experiences 
are learned. 
3.2. Obstructors 
Ariadne identifies four kinds of obstructors: chambers, bottles, barriers, and certain 
corridors. Chambers and bottles are circumscribing rectangular approximations of re- 
stricted spaces that are less narrow than a corridor, and have one or more exits. A 
barrier is a linear approximation of contiguous obstructed positions. A corridor may 
obstruct movement either because it is a dead-end, such as (2,9) in Fig. 6, or because 
it is a non-corner pipe. In the latter case, movement into it necessitates an extra decision 
because its internal locations afford access only to each other. For example, in Fig. 6 
from ( 14,9) there is no reason to pause at ( 14, IO) or ( 14,11) unless the goal lies 
there; if traveling east efficiently, one would go through that pipe, not pause within it. 
Learning an obstructor is often triggered when the robot has been hampered in its 
ability to move through space. There are several measures of such confinement, all 
termed recently constrained: 
l The area of the territory covered by the last x% of the moves was less than y% of 
the total maze area. 
l All the legal moves have been visited at least once. 
l The last x% of the moves was less than y% of the possible maze locations. 
l 2% of the recent moves were visited at least once before. 
A chamber is an irregularly shaped space with an access point and an approximate 
extent. The extent is a bounding rectangle, a compact, heuristic approximation of the 
furthest in each direction one can go in the chamber. The access point is a location 
within the chamber that affords a view outside it, but need not be on the border of the 
extent. Fig. 7(a) shows a chamber with extent 1 north, 13 east, 5 south, and 9 west. 
When the robot moved to access point (4, 13) it saw beyond that extent to the south. 
In principle, all locations reachable from the robot’s initial position really constitute 
a single large chamber, but the chambers that Ariadne learns are more limited and 
room-like. The learning algorithm for a chamber is triggered when the task has been 
underway for some time, the robot has been recently constrained and has been in its 
current location before, there are few legal moves to locations not yet visited on this task 
or the goal is remote, and the current location was not the result of a tier-2 fragment. 
The learning algorithm for a chamber first estimates the dimensions according to its 
current sensing, and then tries to move to a location where the chamber appears both 
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Fig. 7. (a) A learned chamber, with its extent and access point. (b) A learned bottle with its neck and extent. 
higher and wider. From its current location the robot scans once horizontally, and then 
from the scanned location offering the largest view scans once again vertically. (If there 
are no horizontally-adjacent legal locations, the vertical scan is performed first.) If the 
procedure identifies a sequence of one or two locations (access points) that enlarge 
the extent, at least one of which is previously unvisited during this task, it records the 
chamber’s extent and access point on a list. The scan for the chamber in Fig. 7 began 
from (4, 12). A new chamber may subsume an old one, in which case it replaces it on 
the list. Otherwise, chambers are not merged, and they may overlap or have more than 
one access point. 
A bottle is another useful knowledge description of a constrained subspace, similar 
to a chamber. Chambers, however, are learned deliberately by search, whereas bottles 
are learned without search from analysis of the entire path after a task is completed. A 
potential bottle begins with a location that was visited more than once, and is repeatedly 
extended in both directions along the path by immediately neighboring positions only if 
it includes several spots, is not corridor-like, and does not ultimately encompass more 
than x% of the area of the maze. Once a bottle is identified and its extent computed, 
its neck (not necessarily contiguous entry and/or exit point) is identified. Bottles are 
stored in a hash table as an extent and a neck. Fig. 7(b) shows a bottle with extent 12 
north, 6 east, 14 south, and 1 west, and neck (6,2). 
A barrier is a linear approximation of a wall that obstructs movement. Fig. 8 shows 
the barriers learned after IO tasks in a simple maze. The barrier from (13, 10) to 
( I I, 13), for example, is an approximation of the irregular wall in the lower right 
corner of the maze. Barriers are learned different ways, depending upon the search 
context in which they arise. There are four tier-2 Advisors whose search paths have 
clearly prioritized preferences for the direction in which they move. Two attempt to 
circumnavigate an intervening obstruction, one attempts to shift to the opposite side 
of the goal. and another follows along contiguous obstructions. All of these searches 
treat dead-ends as obstructed space. Whether or not these Advisors produce solution 
fragments, barriers are detected from the paths their searches followed. In each case, 
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Fig. 8. After IO tasks, barriers computed for a simple maze. 
the learning algorithm is a function of the preferences in the rationale that produced the 
search path. Experience and Ariadne’s recourse to tier 2 determine which barriers are 
encountered; thus there could have been some barriers learned to describe the irregular 
vertical wall between the eastern and western portions of the maze in Fig. 8, had the 
program encountered difficulty when required to avoid it. Each retained barrier is an 
object with endpoints, slope, intercept, and length. 
4. Pragmatic navigation in action 
An Advisor is a narrow decision-making rationale; in Ariadne, an Advisor is designed 
for maze navigation in general, rather than for some particular maze. As described in 
Section 2, an Advisor is characterized by the tier in which it resides: reactive Advisors 
in tier I, situation-based Advisors in tier 2, and heuristic Advisors in tier 3. Recall too 
that input to an Advisor is always the same: in this domain, the dimensions of the maze, 
the location of the robot, the location of the goal, the legal moves for the robot, the trip 
history, and the features of the maze. Although every Advisor has access to the entire 
useful knowledge store, most apply no more than one or two items. 
Table 1 lists Ariadne’s 32 Advisors with the useful knowledge they reference. (A 
discussion on the origin of Advisors appears in Section 6.) Advisors in tiers 1 and 
2 appear in their prioritized order. Full descriptions of the Advisors’ behavior and 
their parameter values during the experiments appear in the Appendix. The four tier-l 
Advisors are perfectly correct, reactive procedures that decide quickly. The eight tier- 
2 Advisors are situation-based procedures that do time-limited search in an attempt 
to produce a sequence of moves that they then mandate. Each tier-2 Advisor has a 
trigger that signals its applicability and a search method that attempts to compute 
solution fragments to address the identified situation. The solution fragments generated 
by a tier-2 Advisor are tested serially. The 20 tier-3 Advisors are reactive, time-limited 
heuristics that embody path-finding commonsense and do no search in the maze. Each 
may recommend or oppose any number of legal moves that have not already been 
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Table I 
Ariadne’s Advisors with tiers I and 2 in prioritized order 
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Tier Advisor Rationale Useful knowledge 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Victory 
Can Do 
No Way 
Pipeline 
Roundabout 
Outta Here 
Probe 
Patchwork 
Other Side 
Super Quadro 
Wander 
Humpty Dumpty 
Adventure 
Been There 
Chamberlain 
Contract 
Cork 
Corner 
Crook 
Cycle Breaker 
Detour 
Done That 
Giant Step 
Goal Column 
Goal Row 
Home Run 
Hurry 
Leap Frog 
Mr. Rogers 
Opening 
Plod 
Quadro 
If the goal is reachable by a legal move, go there. 
Move adjacent to the goal. 
Avoid dead-ends. 
Avoid internal locations in straight corridors. 
Circumnavigate intervening obstructions. 
Exit chamber or dead-end not containing the goal. 
Determine the current extent and try to leave it. 
Repair plans. 
Move robot to the opposite side of the goal. 
Search for entry into the goal’s quadrant or into 
a new quadrant. 
Move far in an L-shaped path. 
Seek barriers. 
Move to thus far unvisited locations, preferably 
toward the goal. 
Discourage returning to a location already visited 
during this task. 
Move into a chamber that contains the goal; avoid 
a chamber that does not. 
Take large steps when far from the goal, and small 
steps when close to it. 
Move into a bottle that contains the goal; avoid a 
bottle that does not. 
Move to the end of a pipe that promises a turn. 
Move to the end of a crooked corridor. 
Stop repeated visits to the same few spots. 
Move away from barriers that obstruct the goal. 
Discourage moving in the same direction as be- 
fore from a previously-visited location. 
If recently confined, take a long step, preferably 
toward goal. 
Align the robot vertically with the goal, if it is 
not already. 
Align the robot horizontally with the goal, if it is 
not already. 
Move toward bases. 
Take big steps early and small steps late. 
Execute opportunistic plans. 
Move into the neighborhood of the goal. 
Begin as a previously successful path did. 
Take a one-unit step, preferably toward the goal. 
Move into the goal’s quadrant or into a new 
quadrant. 
- 
- 
Corridors 
Corridors 
Barriers, corridors 
Chambers, corridors 
- 
Bases 
- 
Gates 
Barriers, average task steps, 
bases, corridors 
- 
Barriers 
- 
Chambers 
- 
Bottles 
Corridors 
Corridors 
- 
Barriers 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Bases 
Average task steps 
Bases 
- 
Openings 
- 
Gates 
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R robot 
Move Comments (Advisor and strength) Score 
(3.8) Giant Step 8, Adventure 6 4 
(4,X) Giant Step 8, Adventure 6 4 
(538) Adventure 6, Plod 6 2 
(6.3) Home Run IO, Giant Step 10 10 
(6.4) Home Run 8, Mr. Rogers 6, 12 
Giant Step 10, Adventure 8 
(635) Home Run 8, Mr. Rogers 7, 13 
Giant Step 10, Adventure 8 
(636) Home Run 8, Mr. Rogers 8, 19 
Giant Step 10, Adventure 8, 
Goal Column 10 
(67) Mr. Rogers 7. Adventure 8, Plod 8 8 
(7.8) Mr. Rogers 9, Been There 4, Plod 8 6 
(88) Mr. Rogers IO, Giant Step 10, 9 
Been There 4 
Fig. 9. A state in the midst of problem solving, and how tier 3 votes on the next move. The strengths were 
converted from [ 0, 10 I to 1 -S, S I and then summed to produce the scores. 
eliminated by No Way. Although every tier-3 Advisor captures a reasonable rationale 
for navigation, none should be trusted to decide alone. All of them vote together, and 
the simple ideas behind them support rapid computation. Given 10 seconds, none has 
ever run out of time on level 10 problems. 
Pragmatic navigation is achieved by the execution of FORR’s Fig. 3 decision process 
with all the Advisors of Table I. Control is delegated to each tier in turn. A single 
decision may be mandated by tier I, or a solution fragment submitted and executed 
from tier 2, or a top-ranked move selected by vote in tier 3. 
The nature of the voting process in tier 3 is best explained with an example. Fig. 9 
recaps the dilemma at R3 from Fig. 1, a state in the middle of the fourth trip Ariadne 
made through this particular maze. The program has, by this time, some useful knowl- 
edge about this territory, and forwards it to all the tier-3 Advisors, along with a list of 
the IO legal moves. Fig. 9 shows all 30 tier-3 comments for this state, produced by the 
seven tier-3 Advisors that chose to comment. The best supported move is clearly (6,6), 
for a variety of reasons: the position was key in a previous problem (Home Run), it is 
closer to the goal than several other of the legal moves (Mr. Rogers), it is a larger step 
than several other moves (Giant Step), it has not been visited before during the current 
task (Adventure), and it aligns the robot with the goal (Goal Column). Although (6,6) 
is not “on the way” to the goal, once Ariadne repositioned the robot there during this 
task, Roundabout (a tier-2 Advisor that circumnavigates an intervening obstruction) 
triggered and drove the robot to (9,9), from which the problem was quickly solved. 
Fig. 9 demonstrates FORR’s thesis: that many “right” reasons may indeed combine 
to make good decisions. Thus Ariadne does not seek to construct a flawless logical 
explanation for its decisions, only to make satisticing ones. 
For the problem in Fig. IO, Table 2 demonstrates how the satisficing nature of prag- 
matic navigation can have surprising results. Table 2 is an annotated version of three 
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Fig. IO. A level-b problem. 
Table 2 
Three solutions to the problem in Fig. IO 
Generator’s path Second Ariadne solution 
uction 
move 
First Ariadne solution 
8 decisions 
26 path length 
(14, 14) 
(13, 14) 
(13, 12) 
(14, 12) 
(l4,9) 
(9.9) 
(9.2) 
(4,2) 
(4.4) 
IO decisions 
22 path length 
( 14. 14) 
(13.14) 
( 13, 12) identical to generator 
(( 12, 12)) Patchwork fragment 
(lZl2) 
(IO, 12) a shortcut! 
(IO, 13) 
((7, 13) (797) (6,7) (634) (434)) 
Patchwork forces a perfect plan 
(7.13) 
(7,7) 
(637) 
(6.4) 
(4,4) 
42 decisions 
58 path length 
( 14,14) 
(13.14) 
(l3,12) 
( IO, 12) ( 14.12) (IO, 12) 
a good, but indecisive choice 
((IO, 13) (7,13)) 
Wander tries to help 
(IO, 13) 
(7.13) 
(3, 13) overshooting 
(3, 12) partial correction 
(4,12) alignment 
(4.8) too far toward the goal 
Other Side’s fragment to (5,3), 
interrupted by Victory at (6.4) 
(4.4) 
solutions to Fig. 10’s level-8 problem. The first column is the problem generator’s solu- 
tion, the third column is Ariadne’s initial try at it, and the second column is Ariadne’s 
solution after 10 different level-8 learning tasks, including this one, in the same maze. 
In Ariadne’s second solution, as soon as the robot moved to (13,14) it formulated a 
somewhat baroque plan from the bases it had learned: 
((13,14) (13,121 (12,121 (12.5) (9,5)(9,13) (7913) (7>7) (67) (64) (4,4)). 
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Ariadne executed the first step of the plan, and then Patchwork triggered at ( 13, 12). 
The movement from ( 12, 12) to ( 12,5) is illegal, and Patchwork, in its allotted search 
time, did not find a patch to the plan, so it forced only the fragment (( 12, 12)). Ariadne 
moved to ( 12, 12) and then the ordinary decision-making process resumed. Ariadne 
forged ahead to ( 10, 12), then shifted to ( 10,13). Patchwork triggered, recognized 
that the original plan was now fully executable from the newly-accessible (7,13), 
and completed the task. The resultin g solution entailed more decisions, but produced 
a shorter path length than the problem generator’s solution. (The problem generator’s 
solution is optimal only in number of turns, not in path length.) In contrast, Ariadne’s 
first solution began well, if a bit indecisively. Wander’s fragment helped, but the more 
primitive tier-3 Advisors led the robot to a premature alignment with the goal at (3,13), 
an alignment that knowledge helped avoid the second time around. 
5. Empirical design and results 
The data described here was produced when Ariadne generated a maze and tested 
the performance there of different reasoning agents. Because FORR is nondeterministic, 
results from 10 runs (i.e., 10 randomly-generated mazes) were averaged to produce an 
experiment. Throughout this section, cited differences are statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level unless otherwise stated. 
Experiments were performed for problems at some fixed level of difficulty II. A 
problem at level II is generated by selecting a random, unoccupied location for R. 
On the first iteration, the algorithm extends the robot’s location, marking all locations 
reachable by a single legal move. Each newly marked location becomes an element of 
thefringe. On subsequent iterations, each element of the fringe is extended and removed 
from the fringe but remains marked, and a new fringe is formed. If any iteration fails, 
the robot location R is discarded and the process begins anew. After n iterations, every 
element of the fringe is a possible location for G and one is selected at random and 
marked. The problem generator’s solution is thus the sequence of marked locations. The 
number of locations that would have been visited by a breadth-first search algorithm is 
estimated as the total number of locations ever marked in the maze while the problem 
is generated. 
5.1. The ablation experiments 
The first set of experiments demonstrates Ariadne’s ability after learning to solve 
problems it has never before experienced, and explores which components of the pro- 
gram are necessary to achieve such performance. These experiments were performed on 
random mazes, that is, 20 x 20 mazes that were 30% obstructed, with problem levels 
4, 6, 8, and IO. Dimensions and obstruction frequency were selected to provide enough 
possible problems at the specified level of difficulty. Although the generation of square 
mazes with sqme fixed percentage of obstruction has no routines designed to formulate 
hard problems, it offers ample challenges. Note, in Fig. 10 for example, the lengthy, 
irregular wall running from ( l(4) to (6,9), and the deceptive nature of the distance 
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between (8,3) and (7,4), complexities that the problem generator exploits quite nicely. 
In each maze, the full version of Ariadne was given 20 learning problems (R and G 
pairs) at a fixed level of difficulty. Then 10 newly-generated testing problems for the 
same maze and level of difficulty were offered to all the agents with learning turned off. 
After learning, the following agents were tested: 
l Ariadne. 
l The Reactive agent, an ablated version of Ariadne that used only the tier-l Advisors 
to simulate correct, reactive decision making alone. If more than one legal move 
was left after tier 1, this agent made a randomly-selected move. 
l The Reactive+Searclz agent, an ablated version of Ariadne that used only the tier- 
1 and tier-2 Advisors to simulate reactive decision making with situation-based 
behavior but without heuristic reasoning. If no decision was made after tier 2, this 
agent made a randomly-selected move. 
l The Reactive+Heuristic agent, an ablated version of Ariadne that used only the 
tier- 1 and tier-3 Advisors to simulate correct and heuristic reactive decision making 
without situation-based behavior. 
l The No-Learn agent, an algorithm that applied all the Advisors but made no useful 
knowledge available. 
l The No-Plan agent, an algorithm that applied all the useful knowledge and all 
the Advisors except those involved with planning (Leap Frog, Home Run, and 
Patchwork ). 
Separate experiments also tested a random agent that selected random legal moves 
(equivalent to blind search), and a best-first agent that did best-first search with the 
Euclidean distance to the goal as an evaluation function. 
The learning problems established a useful knowledge base for those Advisors that 
depend on it. All agents using such Advisors had equal access to the learned knowledge. 
A problem of either kind was terminated when the reasoning agent reached the goal 
or when it reached the decision step limit which included all exploration during tier-2 
search. This limit was set to 200 on level 4, 300 on level 6, and 400 on level 8. On 
level IO, it was set to 1000 to give the agents ample opportunity to solve each problem. 
The IOOO-decision limit permitted more experience, so that Ariadne acquired additional 
useful knowledge to support better comments. 
In preliminary testing on IO random mazes to determine the efficacy of the random 
agent, Ariadne was permitted 20 learning trips per maze with a IOOO-decision cutoff, 
and then Ariadne and the random agent were tested on 10 trips per maze with a 200- 
decision cutoff. Although Ariadne solved 99% of the level-4 testing problems in the 10 
randomly-generated mazes, the random agent was only able to solve 36%. In addition, 
Ariadne’s solutions to solved problems were significantly shorter (17.53 as opposed to 
27 I .86) and entailed fewer decisions (23. IO instead of 166.06) than the random agent’s, 
The random agent was therefore eliminated from the full ablation experiment. 
Table 3 reports the results for the ablated agents and Ariadne averaged across the 
10 runs in each experiment. In Table 3, a “location” is a distinct square in the grid. 
“Distance” is the Manhattan distance along the path to the goal. Since a step may 
move through one or more locations, path length varies among problems of the same 
difficulty. “Decisions” is the number of steps taken during tier-2 search or solution, 
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Table 3 
The performance of Ariadne and ablated versions of it after learning in a particular 20 x 20 milze in Ariadne’s 
world. Results are averaged over runs in IO mazes 
Agent Distance Decisions Moves Locations Triggers Time Solved 
4-step problems (generator path length 12.47) 
Reactive 124.32 7.5.78 46.4 I 24.69 I.58 81% (0%) 
Reactive+Search 3 I .99 5 I .07 16.38 15.38 4.64 0.5 1 96% (0%) 
Reactive+Heuristic 47.1s 18.66 16.82 9.39 - I .I2 99% (0%) 
No-Learn 2.5.10 53.98 13.01 9.9 I 3.18 0.78 91% (0%) 
No-Plan 16.95 25.14 IO.49 9.82 1.65 0.43 98% (0%) 
Ariadne 16.38 23.90 10.02 9.36 1.44 0.44 98% (51%) 
6-step problems (generator path length 19.19) 
Reactive+Search 53.06 102.60 28.9 I 24.00 8.78 0.99 88% (0%) 
Reactive+Heuristic 62.63 37.48 28.56 13.10 - 3.97 95% (0%) 
No-Learn Sl.34 I 19.46 26.98 17.81 7.29 I .59 86% (0%) 
No-Plan 30.14 47.98 18.71 17.05 2.61 0.9s 99% (0%) 
Ariadne 26.36 39.04 IS.87 14.58 2.20 0.91 97% (38%) 
g-step problems (generator path length 25.62) 
Reactive+Heuristic I IS.37 99.14 41.64 19.42 - 18.00 84% (0%) 
No-Plan 43.74 73.59 26.72 24.47 5.56 2.22 95% (0%) 
Ariadne 41.3s 83.89 2.5.98 23. I2 4.59 2.20 93% (14%) 
IO-step problems (generator path length 3 I .23) 
No-Plan 96.3 I 79.68 39.3 I 24. I4 14.94 8.88 98% (0%) 
Ariadne 72.48 60.44 35.13 23.70 13.95 5.95 97% (19%) 
while “moves” is the number of steps in the solution. The number of distinct locations 
actually visited during those moves is reported as “locations”. “Triggers” measures the 
reliance of the system on tier 2; it is the number of passes through Fig. 3 during which 
any tier-2 Advisor executed. Distance, moves, and locations are computed only over 
solved problems. (This tends to make the ablated agents look somewhat better than 
they actually are, because they solve the easier problems.) “Time” is execution time 
per testing problem, in seconds. The percentage of testing problems solved by Ariadne 
is also listed, with the number solved as well or better than the problem generator’s 
solution in parentheses. 
An ablated agent was eliminated from testing on all subsequent levels if it solved fewer 
than 90% of the problems within the decision-step limit at any given level. On level 4, 
the Reactive agent solved a surprising 8 1% of the testing problems, but with solutions 
that were significantly longer, entailed many more decisions than Ariadne’s, and required 
far more execution time. The Reactive agent succeeded typically when large portions of 
the randomly-generated maze were unreachable from the robot’s starting point, the way 
the upper right corner is in Fig. 1. In such a maze the substantial random component 
of the Reactive agent’s behavior was more likely to be effective. Mazes where Pipeline 
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Table 4 
Percentage of the maw visited by Ariadne 
and by breadth-first search 
Level Breadth-first Ariadne 
4 40.26 3.56 
6 64.62 5.58 
8 86.25 8.83 
IO 95.63 9.19 
was able to veto many choices also supported this agent well. Nonetheless the Reactive 
agent was eliminated after level 4. 
On level 6, Reactive+Search agent and the No-Learn agent produced significantly 
longer paths that required many more decisions. (Note the increased number of triggers 
for No-Learn, as it substitutes search for knowledge.) Both were eliminated after level 
6. Despite its long paths, the ReactivefHeuristic agent was retained because it was able 
to solve 95% of the level-6 problems, but on level 8 its inadequacy became clear. There, 
its paths were far longer and its solution time substantially greater. On level 10, Ariadne 
is clearly faster overall than No-Plan, and produces shorter paths for the problems it 
solves, although once it failed to solve a problem on which No-Plan succeeded. 
There is one important benefit of planning. As discussed in Section 4, the problem 
generator produces a problem whose difficulty is predicated on number of steps rather 
than path length. In reality, however, it is often possible to find a shorter solution with 
more turns, and Ariadne frequently does so. Observe that none of the ablated agents ever 
found a solution as good or better than the problem generator’s. In contrast, Ariadne 
often did so, more than half the time on level 4, 38% of the time on level 6, 14% on 
level 8, and 19% on level IO. Inspection indicates that most of the rest of Ariadne’s 
solutions are near optimal, with an occasional outlier or two driving up the average 
distance. 
To measure the efficacy of Ariadne’s problem solving, compare it with two standard 
AI techniques: breadth-first search and heuristic search with an evaluation equal to the 
Euclidean distance from the robot to the goal. Table 4 compares the fraction of the 
locations accessible to the robot from its starting position visited by breadth-first search 
with that visited by Ariadne. Ariadne only visits a small fraction of the locations. In 
contrast, breadth-first search solved the same problems while exploring an increasingly 
large fraction of the maze. This somewhat understates the cost of a physically executed 
breadth-first search, whose many repetitive subpaths go uncounted here. By comparison, 
in a separate experiment of 10 runs where Ariadne first learned on 20 problems, best- 
first search with only the Euclidean distance to the goal as its evaluation function was 
able to solve only 26% on level 10 within 1000 steps, and averaged path lengths of 
87.65 on these solved problems, versus Ariadne’s 62.99 path length with a 93% success 
rate. Best-first search averaged 164.48 seconds per problem, Ariadne 4.23 seconds. 
In summary, as the problems become more difficult, Tables 3 and 4 show that several 
things happen: breadth-first search reaches an increasing percentage of the accessible 
unobstructed locations, the search-oriented tier-2 Advisors trigger more frequently, and 
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(b) 
Fig. I I. Some non-random environments: (a) warehouse, (b) furnished room, (c) office. Grids are omitted 
for clarity. 
the ability of the ablated agents to solve the problems becomes markedly inferior. 
FORR with tier 2 offers a measure of reliability and achievement the other versions 
lack. Although this work was predicated on the acceptability of suboptimal solutions, 
the successful paths of the ablated agents are extremely long. With all of FORR’s tiers 
in place, Ariadne gets the robot to the goal more often, more quickly, and considers 
fewer alternatives along the way. 
5.2. Peqormance in non-random environments 
Although random mazes present interesting challenges, real navigators face environ- 
ments which are not random. To test Ariadne’s robustness, three other classes of mazes 
intended to model more realistic worlds were constructed. These maze classes represent 
furnished rooms, warehouses, and office suites on a 40 x 40 grid. The non-random mazes 
must be quite large to produce enough even somewhat challenging problems. 
The warehouse maze models a single room, much like the typical basement, garage, 
attic, or storeroom. The generator for a warehouse maze places objects (rectangular 
obstructions) at random on an empty grid. Parameters specify the size and number of 
these objects, the amount of space around them, and the minimum distance an object 
must be from the outer wall of the grid. Objects may not overlap, but may be contiguous 
if the parameters permit. An example of a warehouse maze appears in Fig. 11 (a). 
The furnished room maze models a room whose obstructions are objects that do 
not require a particular regularity. Thus a classroom with regular rows of desks or a 
room with furniture surrounding a television would not be encompassed by this model. 
Like the warehouse maze, parameters specify the size of the objects and the amount of 
space between them. Objects are placed in a furnished room maze in two passes: first 
along (but not touching) the perimeter, and then in the center section. Although precise 
locations are chosen at random, the objects along the perimeter are placed sequentially 
so that there is some measure of balance. Objects along the perimeter are also allowed 
to overlap. As a result the objects often resemble various pieces of furniture, such as a 
sectional couch. An example of a furnished room appears in Fig. 11 (b). 
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The ofice jnaze models a single floor in an office building. Such an environment 
should make good use of space and make all subspaces (the ofices) accessible. Al- 
though several layouts are possible, the generator here produces only mazes with an 
outer rectangle of offices (those that could have windows) bordered within by a rectan- 
gular hallway. The space framed by the hallway is an inner core of connected offices. 
Parameters determine the size of the hallway, and the number of offices along each wall, 
most with a door to the hallway. As in the real world, corner offices are somewhat larger, 
and oftices adjacent to a corner office open only onto the corner office (rather than the 
hallway) to model private spaces accessible only through adjacent offices. Offices within 
the inner core are slightly larger than those on the outer rectangle, and have more doors. 
Office mazes include a few objects placed as if an office were a furnished room. An 
example of an office maze appears in Fig. 11 (c). 
Ariadne was developed for random mazes. Without any changes in the useful knowl- 
edge or the Advisors, we tested the program in mazes like those in Fig. 11. In each 
problem class on each run a new maze (e.g., a warehouse or a furnished room) was 
generated. Ariadne learned on 20 different problems in that maze, and then was tested 
on 10 previously-unseen problems in the same maze. Level-8 problems were run on 
the offices and warehouses, but it was difficult to find a furnished room with enough 
problems at any higher level than 4, presumably because the required gap between the 
perimeter and the furniture provides ready access to most locations. Although these new 
mazes were 4 times larger than those in earlier experiments, the decision-step limit re- 
mained at 1000. Ariadne solved all the furnished room problems easily, 49% of the time 
as well or better than the problem generator’s solution. It also solved all the warehouse 
problems readily, 4 1% as well or better than the problem generator. 
The office mazes presented a greater challenge. Only 5% of Ariadne’s solutions were 
as good or better than the problem generator’s, and in several cases Ariadne did not 
solve the test problem within the 1000 decision-step limit. (In contrast, Ariadne devoted 
an average of 42.83 decisions to furnished room problems, and 84.79 to warehouse 
problems.) Inspection indicated that in most cases the solution was near at hand, but the 
corner offices had been sufficiently deceptive to demand additional search. One obvious 
solution would be to create a representation for linked chambers, where the access point 
for one chamber is in the extent of the next. Although this is readily programmable, it 
would not have been appropriate to add it to Ariadne to facilitate solutions in offices. 
Other than that, this testing in non-random environments appears to be evidence that 
Ariadne’s knowledge representation is adequate for most two-dimensional grid worlds, 
and that its satisficing approach scales. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Why does FORK work? 
FORR works because it allocates control appropriately. Control here is whether to 
react, to search, or to guess intelligently. When a quick and obvious reaction is appro- 
priate, tier I responds correctly. Tier 1 prevents foolish errors and guarantees easy right 
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answers. When pre-identified needs that should be addressed with a particular search 
routine arise, tier 2 does so. Tier 2 provides appropriate, more thoughtful, more costly 
responses. Rather than reproduce the safeguards of tier I in every tier-2 Advisor, tier 
1 monitors tier-2 fragments during their execution, and can interrupt them if neces- 
sary. When tier 1 has prevented obvious mistakes and search should not be an option, 
tier 3 formulates a guess as a compromise among reasonable heuristics. In this way, 
search is minimized, decisions are timely and well-founded, and no egregious errors are 
committed. 
FORR also works because it responds to context appropriately. Context here is how 
what one knows affects how and what one decides. A FORR-based system knows the 
right reasons (Advisors) for doing things in the domain, and how those reasons should 
relate to one another (their assignment to and sequence in the tiers). A FORR-based 
system also knows what is worth learning (useful knowledge), how to learn it, and how 
to apply it (again, the Advisors). Useful knowledge can be represented in many ways, 
acquired in many ways, and applied in many ways. That flexibility brings to bear what 
the FORR-based system knows exactly when it needs it. Decisions are based not only 
on general, prespecified principles but also on information acquired from experience. 
It is important to note that the Advisors of Table 1 and the useful knowledge of 
Section 3 were all developed only for random mazes. The other problem classes are quite 
recent and no changes of any kind were made to adjust for them. Domain knowledge 
(here, useful knowledge, Advisors, and learning methods) is a powerful tool. Of course, 
a one-domain demonstration of an architecture does not entirely validate it. The interested 
reader is referred to Hoyle, a FORR-based program for learning to play two-person, 
perfect information, finite-board games [9,10]. To date Hoyle has learned to play 18 
different games as well or better than the best human opposition. The games Hoyle 
plays are relatively simple; none of them has a search space larger than several billion 
states. People, however, find these games quite challenging and in many ways play them 
very much like Hoyle [ 361. Although Hoyle’s Advisors are all reactive (tiers 1 and 3 
here), a set of tier-2 Advisors is currently under development. 
How would Ariadne extend to other path-finding domains? Path finding on a printed 
map would work from correct knowledge and provide the opportunity to reason backward 
from the goal’s location as well as forward from the robot. This suggests additional 
Advisors that direct the robot’s approach with the facilitators and obstructors already in 
place, such as tier-2 bidirectional planners that would target positions one or two known 
legal steps from the goal. Path finding in large scale space would probably require a 3- 
part process: long-distance travel through a network of highways plus two local searches 
like those currently performed. One local search would join the starting robot location 
R to the chosen highway route; the second would join the chosen highway route to the 
goal location G. The long-distance segment could either rely on standard graph search 
algorithms or be done in a FORR-based system. Since a highway network is structured 
to facilitate travel, a FORR-based long-distance solution would require additional useful 
knowledge (such as highway interchanges) and Advisors to exploit it. 
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Ariadne imposes the same spatial descriptions of experience on both random grids and 
more realistic ones. The program learns instances of those descriptions and applies those 
instances to navigate. Because the random domain is deliberately impoverished, without 
landmarks or tasks that reflect some regularity (such as a central distribution point or 
a docking station as a consistent R), these descriptions must be very general. Ariadne 
could, however, readily be augmented to learn other descriptions, such as landmarks. 
One would only need to add a category of useful knowledge, a method to learn it, and 
Advisors to reference it. In other words, a richer domain would make this task easier 
but not invalidate the fundamental approach. 
If unlimited computation time were available, if failure were intolerable, or if opti- 
mality were essential, FORR’s approach would not be appropriate. The right reasons 
and useful knowledge for many domains, however, are readily accessible, and FORR’s 
modularity facilitates application development. Two substantial FORR-based systems 
are currently under development. The first, for transportation resource scheduling, as- 
signs trucks and drivers to pick up and deliver about 1000 loads in the course of a 
work day. Human experts at this task are observed to use a host of tier-3-like heuris- 
tics, but we believe that tier-2 Advisors will make a substantial contribution. Initial 
results with a preliminary version are quite promising. The second system constructs 
a three-dimensional model of a protein from its formula. Here the Advisors are fewer 
and more complex, and weight learning (described in Section 6.7) will be particularly 
important. 
6.3. How a search space engenders a FORR-based system 
It is possible to reason about the traversal of a search space without complete knowl- 
edge of its geography. In this sense, Ariadne’s visible space provides a metaphor for 
state space search. Unintelligent search is blind, just like the ablated version that sought 
the goal without using Ariadne’s limited vision. In many AI artifacts, intelligence has 
been simulated with an evaluation function that measures proximity to the goal. Decep- 
tive problems foil this approach because the “obvious” evaluation function overlooks 
subtleties in the problem space. (Recall that “deceptive” was defined here as “when 
proximity is not a valid indicator of progress”. Indeed, the term “deceptive” was bor- 
rowed from work in genetic algorithms to address similar difficulties.) The purpose of 
this section is to suggest some additional ways to think about a search space, and to 
exploit knowledge about it in a FORR-based system. 
The kind of knowledge available about a domain should inspire an Advisor, and also 
typically determines its tier. To instantiate the ideas behind Ariadne in another domain, 
the reader should consider what can be learned or observed, at what cost, and how it is 
best exploited. The experiments described above took great care to monitor the cost of 
search. The surprise in Ariadne is that in non-random environments like furnished rooms 
and warehouses it is rarely necessary to plan to reach the goal. For example, there is 
little point in a tier-2 hill-climbing Advisor for distance to the goal location; the robot 
often behaves that way anyway, and, when it does not behave that way, there is usually 
a set of good reasons for that behavior. The reader is therefore encouraged to begin 
with Brooks’ recommendations 141, but to leaven them with learning and situation- 
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based search. Save search for clearly defined situations with efficient algorithms for 
ameliorating them. 
If you decide to construct a FORR-based system, do so gradually, testing it on a 
suite of increasingly difficult problems. Begin with tier-l and tier-3 Advisors, and add 
Advisors only as the need for them arises. Monitor the Advisors for the resources they 
require, remembering that tier-l and tier-3 Advisors should be relatively inexpensive. 
Monitor too the frequency with which they comment. Irrelevant Advisors will not 
comment; they are unnecessary and should be quickly dropped. Take pains not to make 
an Advisor problem dependent, for example, designed for a particular maze; a valid 
rationale should be broadly applicable. Although the rationales behind tier-3 Advisors 
need not partition the reasons for good decision making in the domain, try to minimize 
overlap and to keep each premise simple. This minimizes the possibility of repetitive 
Advisors, which effectively give one Advisor the ability to vote more strongly than the 
others, a poor choice. 
Individual Advisors often encapsulate what people consider commonsense, such as 
Mr. Rogers’ “get closer” or Giant Step’s “take long steps”. The kinds of mistakes made 
during problem solving by a FORR-based system under development typically suggest 
new Advisors, or corrections to the rationale behind existing ones. It is also possible in 
some domains to automate the discovery of tier-3 Advisors and gradually phase them into 
decision making. Pattern-oriented, tier-3 Advisors for game playing have been learned 
from visual cues [ 13 1 and have been shown to improve performance there [ 141. These 
Advisors were based on a limited vocabulary of shapes that was instantiated during 
extensive play experience and then generalized. Extendibility of the vocabulary becomes 
a crucial issue here. In a path-finding domain, to learn Advisors one would begin with 
a vocabulary of spatial terminology (such as “connect” and “constrained”) and then 
postulate Advisors that would combine those terms in useful ways. Such a program 
could learn to manage corner oflice suites as a sequence of connected components. 
For those attempting to extend the principles of Ariadne or FORR to other appli- 
cations, the remainder of this section categorizes Ariadne’s Advisors by the kind of 
knowledge they apply to maneuver through the state space of the maze world. Full 
details on Ariadne’s individual Advisors appear in the Appendix by tier; the purpose of 
this section is to characterize their approach to intelligent search. Many of the Advisors, 
the reader will note, are actually about search and not restricted the maze world. 
6.3.1. Correct conditions as good as shallow search 
A correct condition can be used to generate good single actions instead of searching 
for them. Rather than examine all the legal actions, an Advisor predicated on a correct 
condition can generate one or more choices from the problem description and then 
test to see if that action is among the legal moves. Ariadne’s Victory, for example, 
makes a single move that reaches the goal. Most domains have some intrinsic version 
of Victory, such as a decision that immediately wins a game. Ariadne’s Can Do, as a 
second example, forces a move to a location vertically or horizontally adjacent to the 
goal, setting Victory up for the next decision. Some domains have a version of Can Do; 
for example, in chess Can Do is checkmate, since the actual win occurs when the king 
is captured. Victory does not look at all possible next states to see if the robot reaches 
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the goal in one of them, nor does Can Do look two moves away in the search space. 
Instead Victory interprets visibility as accessibility, and seeks the goal-achieving move 
among its legal options. Similarly, Can Do interprets adjacency as near-accessibility, 
and seeks a one-from-the-goal move among its legal options. An Advisor that correctly 
exploits a condition as good as shallow search assumes that a chosen operator will 
execute properly, that is, no other agent or aspect of the environment will prevent the 
Advisor from achieving its purported post-condition. An Advisor that correctly exploits 
a condition as good as shallow search belongs in tier 1, where it offers quick and easy 
access to nearby solutions. 
63.2. Constrained subspaces and hindrances 
A constrained subspace can be used to curtail unnecessarily repetitive search. In- 
formally, a constrained subspace is a set of states in a state space that afford ready 
access to each other, and very little access to other portions of the space. In the maze 
world, a chamber, a bottle, and a corridor represent constrained subspaces. In other, 
less visually-oriented domains, a constrained subspace would be a set of states whose 
neighbors are primarily (but not exclusively) themselves, so that search would cycle 
among them. An example of a constrained subspace in another domain is a set of game 
states where two players shuttle the same piece or two between a small set of locations. 
No intelligent agent would deliberately search within a constrained subspace unless it 
believed that a goal state lay there; it would seek an operator that left the constrained 
subspace instead. 
More formally, let S be a set of states in a state space and let S, denote the set 
of immediate neighbors of s E S, those accessible by a single operation on s. Let an 
exit from S be a state s E S such that S,Y - S f 0, that is, a state not all of whose 
neighbors lie in S. A subspace S is constrained if and only if it has relatively few 
exits proportional to (SI. By definition, Ariadne’s constrained subspaces have at least 
one exit, such as the exit from a dead-end or the access point of a chamber. Bear in 
mind, however, that visible space in Ariadne is only a useful metaphor for this concept; 
constrained subspaces can occur in any domain. 
Learning the extent of a constrained subspace often requires search. Thus Ariadne 
has a tier-2 (search-based) Advisor called Probe that delineates what it perceives to be 
a chamber, a constrained subspace with at least one exit, its access point. Such search 
is appropriately triggered when the agent senses confinement in the search space, and 
terminated when an exit is identified. Confinement is measured in Ariadne by how little 
of the territory the robot can see or how few distinct locations it has been to recently. 
It is also possible to induce a confined space with a post-solution critique of the path 
through the search space. This is the essence of the learning algorithm for bottles. 
Once a constrained subspace and its exit(s) are identified, an Advisor can exploit it 
by refusal to move through an exit into a constrained subspace that does not contain 
a goal state. In Ariadne, for example, an intelligent agent has no reason to enter a 
dead-end nor to pause in a pipe not believed to contain the goal. Unless the goal is 
in the pipe, locations within the pipe cannot ever provide a new option, and can only 
increase the number of steps in any solution. This is why Ariadne treats a pipe as a set 
of locations to be avoided. Advisors that prune search with knowledge about constrained 
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subspaces can appear in any tier. In tier 1, No Way keeps the robot from entering a 
dead-end, and Pipeline keeps it from pausing in a pipe. Since an agent may begin in a 
constrained subspace, or heuristically stumble into one, Advisors to leave a constrained 
subspace that does not contain a goal state are also necessary. This is what Outta Here 
does, for example, searching for an exit from a chamber or dead-end in tier 2, and what 
Chamberlain and Cork do in tier 3 by their reactions to knowledge about chambers and 
bottles, respectively. 
Yet another kind of knowledge that prunes search is a hindrance, a set of states in 
a state space which share a property whose presence guarantees that the goal is not 
achieved in the state. In the maze world, the presence of a barrier between the robot and 
the goal constitutes a hindrance. An example of a hindrance in another domain is the 
inability to move a particular playing piece to a particular place on a game board, such 
as the king’s location in chess. In any domain, search may visit states with hindrances 
until quite close to the goal, but the elimination of a particular hindrance can be quite 
productive. Since all the hindrances that can arise during problem solving may not 
be predictable from the initial state, an intelligent agent cannot merely decompose the 
problem into a set of subgoals that are non-hindrance conditions. Ariadne, for example, 
does not know where all the barriers lie. An intelligent agent can address particular 
hindrances as they arise, either reactively, or with situation-based search from the current 
state, or with situation-based search for plan revision, or even by deliberately seeking 
out hindrances and then avoiding them. Ariadne’s Detour, Roundabout, Patchwork, and 
Humpty Dumpty are examples of these approaches, respectively. Because knowledge 
about hindrances is likely to be heuristic, Advisors that rely on them reside in tier 2 or 
tier 3. 
6.3.3. Transition regions 
Although many of us are accustomed to imagining state space as a vast and somewhat 
formless graph, it may well have a shape that suggests solutions. A transition region is a 
set of locations that permits movement from one portion of a space to another. Ariadne 
represents its search space in quadrants, which suggests transition regions between them. 
Fig. 12 identifies transition regions A through N among the quadrants for the maze 
from Fig. I. For clarity, the horizontal and vertical pairs of transition regions are shown 
separately, in Figs. 12(a) and 12(b), respectively. A location is in a transition region if 
a single decision from it would move the robot to another quadrant. For example, from 
any of E = { (6,3), (6,4), (6,5)} in quadrant 3 the robot could move east to region 
F in quadrant 4 in one step. Q, denotes the portion of quadrant i not in a transition 
region. 
The summary graph in Fig. 12(c) links two transition regions if they have a location 
in common or if a single decision could shuttle the robot between them. The summary 
graph makes it quite clear, for example, that travel to regions B or N is of limited value, 
and that travel from N to the rest of the fourth quadrant (Qd) will require movement 
through region D in the first quadrant. Because the summary graph can substantially 
reduce the number of nodes in the search space (from 64 to 17 in this case), it is a 
powerful planning tool. Its construction, however, requires exhaustive search through the 
state space. Instead. a single representative of a transition region can expedite movement 
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Fig. 12. The horizontal (a) and vertical (b) pairs of transition regions. (c) The summary graph for the same 
maze 
through the state space. Ariadne’s gates are a heuristic approximation of the summary 
graph for a maze. For example, learning (5,7) as a gate in Fig. 12 would describe 
the relationship among regions C, D, and F, as well as how to reach (5,7) through 
the overlap of its extent with Ql and Q,+. Thus one way to approach a problem in the 
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maze world would be to search for an intervening transition region, the way Qt must 
precede movement from N; Quadro is a reactive version. A tier-2 planning Advisor for 
movement through a sequence of quadrants would also be a reasonable idea, one not 
implemented here. 
6.3.4. Other classifications of (search) space 
It is also possible to classify a state space according to a set of conditions that 
characterize the relationship between the states visited thus far during search and the 
goal state. If search has not been productive, it can be constructive to search for a 
state whose classification is different. In Ariadne, for example, a tier-2 Advisor called 
Other Side monitors the robot’s position in space with respect to the goal. If the robot 
has remained, say, consistently south of the goal, Other Side may devote resources to 
moving it north of the goal. Wander is a tier-2 Ariadne Advisor whose classification 
mechanism is based on the notion of moving away from a small set of states. Advisors 
like these, that use knowledge derived from costly search procedures, should be triggered 
only when there is some likelihood of their success, and assigned to tier 2. 
When decisions arc primarily heuristic, the same superficially “right” reasons may 
repeatedly draw the agent to the same non-productive states. Therefore, in a satisficing 
approach like FORR, more general classifications describing what the agent has de- 
cided in the past can be quite useful. Advisors with such a historical perspective are 
typically in tier 3. Ariadne’s Been There, Done That, Cycle Breaker, and Adventure 
have counterparts in many domains. Been There discourages revisiting a state; Done 
That discourages repeating the same transition out of a state. Cycle Breaker is a tier-3 
Advisor to suggest alternatives that are different in the current context, while Adventure 
suggests states entirely new in the current task. A similar, exploratory heuristic has been 
applied to Go [32]. 
It is also possible for an Advisor to take a historical perspective on a set of tasks. 
Ariadne’s Opening supports the reuse of the beginning of a previously successful path. It 
has a counterpart in most domains, most obviously for openings in game playing. Home 
Run and Leap Frog are both dependent on bases, historically useful generalizations over 
states in the space. (A base is a generalization because it ignores the location of the 
goal.) 
Still other classilications compare alternative actions and select extremes. Ariadne’s 
Giant Step and Plod, for example, advocate extreme step size, the former large steps and 
the latter small ones. A similar heuristic was employed in AM and Eurisko [ 29,301. 
6.3.5. The role of reactivity 
Reactivity is an important component in both Ariadne and FORR. Inexpensive sens- 
ing and simplistic reasoning can actually combine to produce a remarkable number of 
fast and wise decisions. Although the ablation experiment proved that these were not 
enough to solve the most difficult problems efficiently, they did prove to be an impor- 
tant component. Advisors that favor simple environment sensors are typically reactive 
heuristics for tier 3, as are all such Advisors in Ariadne: Goal Row and Goal Column 
concern alignment with the goal, Mr. Rogers and Contract react to distance from the 
goal, Corner and Crook react to what is visible. 
305 
6.4. Cognitive plausildity 
There is no claim here that Ariadne is a cognitive model of a human navigator, 
only that many of its features are cognitively plausible. Several of the Advisors do 
model principles of naive geographic reasoning [8] all of us readily recognize: Plod’s 
tentativeness, Adventure’s curiosity, and Hurry’s anxiety. In addition, cognitive scientists 
have found empirical evidence for Contract’s rationale [ 181 and the rationales of several 
of the other Advisors [20]. A literature search, however, reveals no tests of human 
subjects on problems as difficult as these. 
The integration of reactivity, heuristics, and search as situation-based behavior is 
based upon the detection of all three approaches in people [23]. There is increasing 
evidence that FORR, Ariadne’s underlying architecture, accurately captures aspects of 
human problem solving. In a variety of domains, from circuit design to game playing, 
psychologists report that people integrate multiple, parallel, possibly conflicting strategies 
to make decisions [ 2,6,37]. During problem solving, people describe multiple, possibly 
inconsistent, rationales relevant to a single goal [ 361. The brain appears to use a modular 
architecture to accomplish integration of information [ 7,461. 
The use of a learning architecture, rather than a prespecified one, is supported by 
evidence that people evolve superior performance. Human expertise develops only from 
repeated experience at problem solving [ l-17,33]. This expertise is applicable to 
a related set of problem classes. For example, an expert path finder in unfamiliar 
territory will immediately wonder about dead-ends and not about the color of ob- 
structions. Experts rely upon a foundation of domain knowledge for a source of fo- 
cus and direction to provide a baseline level of competence. Thus the architecture 
need not begin with total ignorance; it is reasonable to provide it with general do- 
main knowledge and the methods to specialize it, for example, by learning feature 
instances. 
Ariadne’s facilitators and obstructors form its cognitive map, its representation of 
its world. These features are consistent with the ways humans represent space. People 
use constructed representations of the visual world to make inferences about space, 
representations that are based upon, but more abstract and general than, perception 
[44]. These representations systematically distort visual perception to facilitate recall 
[45]. They are integrated with many other kinds of information to form a model that 
the human user does not require to be complete or consistent. Ariadne’s reliance upon 
multiple representations and its tolerance for inconsistent and even incorrect information, 
geographers tell us, is much like the naive geography that people rely on [ 81. Even the 
use of levels (number of turns) for degree of problem difficulty is supported by results 
that people gauge distance that way [ 381. 
There are two ways to view Ariadne’s task as resource-limited. If CPU time is a 
scarce resource, then the agent that makes the fewest passes through FORR’s decision 
structure in Fig. 3 is best. If travelin g time or fuel is a scarce resource, then the agent 
that constructs the shortest paths is best. On both metrics the full FORR agent achieves a 
synergy that the ablated versions lack. The behavior of human subjects asked to traverse 
a variety of routes on a campus was also explained by distance, time, and number of 
turns (here, problem level) [ 181. 
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6.5. Situation-based behavior as a compromise on search 
The initial impulse behind reactive programming was to avoid search, to make instead 
decisions that were local in time (unconfirmed by search) and local in space (restricted 
to current perception). When one augments the reactive Advisors of tier 1 and tier 
3 with tier 2, it is easy to forget that. Tier 2 Advisors are kept within the search 
minimization philosophy in two ways. First, FORR only allocates each Advisor, in any 
tier, a limited amount of computing time. Solution fragments that take too long to 
construct will not arise. Second, tier-2 Advisors have hand-coded routines intended to 
address their particular subgoals. These routines generate and test solution fragments, but 
the proposed partial solutions are highly constrained, to address the situation identified 
by the trigger while preserving resources. This constraint saves the tier-2 Advisor from 
a combinatoric explosion. For example, as detailed in the Appendix, Roundabout’s 
search is quite deep, but it is also severely curtailed by knowledge; that is why it is 
effective. 
As discussed in Section 2, tier-2 Advisors are intended to simulate behavior observed 
by psychologists studying time-limited decision making [23]. The decision makers 
described how they first recognized a particular category of situation (in Ariadne, the 
trigger), and then applied a procedure tailored to that situation type (in Ariadne, the 
search) that proposed a kind of solution deemed appropriate to that situation category. 
In FORR’s interpretation, such situation-based behavior is not case-based reasoning 
(CBR), although they have much in common. In CBR, experiences are indexed and 
stored. Later, one or more potentially relevant cases are retrieved, and an attempt is made 
to modify their solutions to solve the current problem [24]. Although situation-based 
behavior is triggered by an abstraction of the current state that could have been used 
as an index for CBR. situation-based behavior does not retrieve specific solutions to 
be modified, only procedures intended to generate solution fragments. Situation-based 
behavior and CBR both constrain solution generation, but CBR does it by searching 
from old solutions, while situation-based behavior does it by the knowledge inherent 
in its procedures. Klein and Calderwood emphasize that the human experts they study 
do not perceive their problem solving as reminding. (This is not a claim that CBR has 
no parallel in people, only that it is less likely to be used when resources are very 
limited.) 
Situation-based behavior is not the same as planning either. A plan is a set of ac- 
tions intended to reach a specific goal [43]. The Advisors of tier 2 are not planners 
because they actually execute their behavior, even if they do not eventually recom- 
mend it. For example, Wander can investigate as many as eight L-shaped paths (one 
longest step in each direction plus a possible second step) before it chooses one to 
execute. Rather than planners, situation-based Advisors are procedures that reactively 
seize control of a FORR-based program’s resources for a fixed period of time. When 
that time elapses, the situation-based Advisor either returns control to tier 3 or returns 
a sequence of actions whose execution it requires. Tier 3 constitutes a reactive decision 
maker, much like Pengi [ 11. The principal difference is that Pengi’s problem is living 
in its world; it is not held to an explicit decision standard like “solved in 1000 decision 
steps”. 
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Situation-based behavior is a resource-grabbing, heuristic digression intended to pro- 
duce a solution fragment, not a production rule or a macro-operator. Although the trigger 
of a tier-2 Advisor could be the condition of a production rule, the comment genera- 
tor’s response is too complex (particularly since it can be overridden by tier 1) to be 
the action part. A macro-operator is a generalization across the variables entailed in a 
successful procedure, whereas a situation-based Advisor is a procedural generalization 
over several kinds of behavior appropriate to a situation. 
Finally, situation-based behavior sheds some light on the ongoing debate about rep- 
resentation and reactivity [22]. Ariadne’s conceptual knowledge includes “the last 30% 
of the moves have been in no more than 5% of the locations in the maze” and “a wall 
lies between the aligned robot and the goal”. This paper demonstrates that, at least in 
this domain, the representation of conceptual knowledge as a context is an essential 
component in a reactive learner. 
6.6. The interaction among reactivity, heuristics, and search 
Ablation shows the interdependence among reactivity, heuristics, and situation-based 
behaviors. Without tier 2, FORR is a reactive system augmented by learned useful 
knowledge. The results with the Reactive+Heuristic agent, however, simply are not 
good enough. This agent regularly gets stuck in regions where Giant Step cannot ex- 
tricate it; it needs maneuvers like Wander’s L-shaped path to get out. It also regularly 
gets close to the goal but cannot reach it because of an intervening wall; it needs 
Roundabout’s determined circumnavigation to get closer. The situation-based Advisors 
of tier 2 make a clear contribution when combined with tier 1 as Reactive-tSearch, 
but they have a limited repertoire of behaviors. The situation-based Advisors are in- 
sufficient on their own. They trigger significantly more often with ReactivetSearch 
than with Ariadne, because most of their triggers measure lack of recent progress, 
something the robot experiences more often with ReactivefSearch. Tier 2 is, effec- 
tively, a device to execute subgoals. The subgoal is the opposite of the trigger, for 
example, Wander tries to “get out of here”, and Roundabout tries to “get around the 
wall”. Subgoals are detected by the program, but their nature is predetermined by the 
programmer. 
There is a complex relationship among the tiers. Tier 1 offers the commonsense 
inherent in any problem-solving task. Tier 3 tries to avoid search and effectively sets up 
the situation-based Advisors in tier 2 so that they can trigger. For example, Goal Row 
and Goal Column move the robot where Roundabout can trigger. In turn, the situation- 
based Advisors of tier 2 set up the heuristic reasoners in tier 3. For example, Wander 
puts the robot where many tier-3 Advisors are more likely to make newly constructive 
comments. Another important side-effect of the search in tier 2 is the acquisition of 
useful knowledge, from which Advisors in every tier can benefit. 
6.7. The role qf learning in pragmatic navigation 
As the data indicate, learning is essential to an agent facing hard problems with 
limited resources. The ablated No-Learn agent failed to solve many of the hardest 
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problems, while the full version could perform quite well after only 20 learning trials. 
Even on level 6, No-Learn was slower to solve problems than Ariadne because its lack 
of knowledge forced it to meander more about the nraze. 
One hallmark of Ariadne’s pragmatic navigation, as Table 1 indicates, is the variety 
of procedures for the same useful knowledge. Corridors demonstrate the flexible use 
of knowledge; the same data in a single representation is applied by seven different 
Advisors. Barriers demonstrate the flexible acquisition of knowledge; the experience of 
four different Advisors provides fodder for learning them. 
Nor is there apparently any danger of learning so much useful knowledge that a 
detailed, static map of the maze would have been a more efficient representation than 
Ariadne’s learned heuristic features. After 20 level-8 problems in 20 x 20 random 
mazes, for example, there were on average only 32.5 barriers, 80.5 bases, 1.6 bottles, 
3.9 chambers, 49.3 corridors, and 18.0 gates. As a graph, however, such a maze would 
have 280 nodes and approximately 1485 edges. 
Perhaps the most interesting challenge is that of balancing the Advisors’ comments. 
Even among randomly-generated mazes there are different kinds. Some may conceal the 
goal behind wall-like structures, others place it at the end of a tortuous path. When one 
compares in Table 3 the number of decisions used to solve a problem with the number 
of triggers, it is clear that most of Ariadne’s decisions were made in tier 3, and that the 
program’s overall performance could still be improved. The key to this, we believe, is 
to have the program learn to value tier-3 Advisors appropriately. AWL is an algorithm 
that FORR uses to learn weights to apply to the voting in tier 3 [ 111. AWL, however, 
was formulated for a domain (game playing) where the learner necessarily has access 
to a model of expertise (its opposition). As described here, Ariadne is an autonomous 
learner. Although initial testing indicated that weights trained on the problem generator’s 
paths would improve performance, we are currently adapting AWL to retain Ariadne’s 
autonomy. 
6.8. The role of plunnir~g in pragmatic navigation 
The simple planning in Ariadne is a surprisingly effective tool. Although the plans 
themselves are naive, they are inexpensive to generate. The three plan-related Advi- 
sors (Home Run, Leapfrog, and Patchwork) together average only 0.15 17 seconds of 
computation per problem during level-10 testing. On average Ariadne constructs 14.58 
(not necessarily distinct) plans for a level- 10 problem during testing, from an average 
of 77.0 available bases. Because bases are strengthened with each re-identification, and 
three different Advisors use them, over time Ariadne develops habitual routes, just the 
way people do. It is not uncommon during testing, or even late in the learning stage, 
to see Ariadne formulate a reasonable plan fairly early and execute it in its entirety. 
This also means that, unless some fortuitous choice occurs, the program is unlikely to 
develop shortcuts on its own; those would have to be taught. 
Because a plan in Ariadne is a sequence of positions from the robot’s current location 
to the goal, a plan is not reactive in Schoppers’ sense 1391. Ariadne’s planning is, 
instead, a reaction to the fact that it currently has no applicable plan and that it has 
the knowledge (the bases) from which to attempt to construct one. The preference for 
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planning from strategic locations (bases) instead of considering all possible choices is 
similar to the approach in [40]. Ariadne’s plans are deliberately structured to support 
legal travel (their orthogonal moves) and to be readily patched by a circumnavigation 
routine. Using bases to plan also makes the overly optimistic assumptions that Ariadne’s 
routes are correct and that the robot has had adequate travel experience throughout the 
maze. This is why not too much time is invested in plan construction or correction; it 
is generally more efficient to replan. 
The component ripe for development in Ariadne is planning. No Advisor considers 
barriers, gates, or corridors in plan construction, or links chambers and bottles together 
to facilitate travel into the corner offices of the office mazes. An Advisor that reasoned 
efficiently with these useful knowledge items could make a significant contribution, as 
long as it was appropriately wary of the heuristic nature of the information. 
6.9. The real world 
Although Ariadne would require adaptation before it could direct a real-world robot, 
pragmatic navigation embodies principles that roboticists would do well to consider. 
When territory is distant (a planet), dangerous (deep sea terrain), or dynamic (a 
warehouse), correct and complete maps may be unavailable and a feature orientation 
becomes quite practical. The nature of the maze already permits irregularly-shaped 
territory, since the mazes may have unreachable sections along their edges, as in Fig. 1. 
For the real world, the fineness of the grid would also have to be determined. Given 
the heuristic nature of useful knowledge and the inaccuracies of measuring devices and 
robotic controls, however, one really does not want a very fine grid: approximations in 
pragmatic navigation are tolerable and tolerated. 
The primary issue in adaptation would be the sensors. Their inaccuracies would 
require modifications to allow a margin of error. Continuous, rather than discrete, sensing 
would be more costly. Permitting the robot to sense and travel in only four orthogonal 
directions was more limiting than the equipment on most robots, but not far from human 
proclivities [ 191. The equidistant placement of the four sensors was judged appropriate 
for a task where forward motion was often no more productive than lateral or backward 
movement. A more generous number of sensors and directions should do better, although 
it could require increased computation and would necessitate revision of some of the 
algorithms. 
Finally, in many real-world problems the goal is not completely stationary; it may 
drift or attempt avoidance maneuvers. Standard AI search methods have no provision 
for this. No real difficulty is foreseen if G were to move, say, one unit in a randomly 
chosen direction after each two of Ariadne’s moves. The instability of G should be a 
nice fit with the opportunistic planner. 
7. Related work 
This work has some clear counterparts with Korf’s analysis of heuristic search in 
the tile puzzles [25]. His minimin search “strategy of least commitment” is shared by 
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Ariadne’s Plod, but it of necessity lengthens the number of steps in a solution. For 
example, if the correct, unobstructed move is from ( I, 1) to ( 1, IO), plodding will take 
9 moves to get there, although an immediate move to ( 1, 10) would be legal. Ariadne’s 
Mr. Rogers uses the Euclidean distance heuristic much the way Korf tried heuristic 
node ordering in the tile puzzles, and with the same disappointing results. Once you get 
close in this domain, too, there may be better ways to reach the goal. Korf’s permission 
to backtrack with loop prevention is analogous to some of the decision making in 
Roundabout. Ariadne has no foolproof loop prevention, but Been There, Cycle Breaker, 
and Done That discourage loops. In Ariadne’s graph (rather than tree) search space, 
Korf indicates that one cannot expect locally optimal solutions. If the search horizon 
were limited only by how far the robot could see ahead, the Reactive+Heuristic agent 
should solve few problems, since it sees only one step ahead. That agent’s better than 
expected performance is attributable to its useful knowledge about a particular maze and 
its general maze-traveling knowledge in the tier-3 Advisors. It is possible to dictate the 
level of difficulty in Ariadne’s problems, but with the tile puzzles there remains some 
uncertainty about how the level of difficulty impacts upon the ability of the problem 
solver. 
Although Ariadne’s maze problems may be reminiscent of recent machine learning 
work in reinforcement learnin g, it is important to note that the program’s task and fun- 
damental approach are significantly different [ 3 1,421. Such programs seek convergence 
to an optimal path through repeated solution of what, according to the definition in Sec- 
tion I, would be a single problem. In contrast, Ariadne has no mechanism that would 
guarantee optimality, and will quickly settle upon the same route in most cases. Ariadne 
constructs satisticing paths for a set of problems, applying knowledge learned from one 
problem to the others, instead of from one problem-solving attempt to another attempt 
at the same problem. The complexity of a maze problem for the reinforcement learners 
is a function of both goal strength and the number of state-action pairs (the number of 
reachable locations and directed one-step movements from them). The complexity of a 
problem for Ariadne, on the other hand, is the number of turns required, independent of 
the size of the maze and the strength of the goal. Memory use is different, too. Ariadne 
learns abstractions, while the reinforcement learners refine estimates for the value of 
each one-step move attempted from each state. 
A second, recently suggested learning approach was a case-based planning method 
for the grid world that operated in a set of abstraction spaces, and stored both detailed 
and abstracted solution paths [ 31. These mazes were somewhat simpler versions of Ari- 
adne’s warehouses, which present few dead-ends, narrow-necked chambers or bottles, or 
effective barriers between large regions. Once again, Ariadne would find them relatively 
easy. 
One way to characterize an approach to learning navigation for a robot is by the degree 
to which it is engineered, that is, to which the robot’s abilities are preprogrammed. 
Work in this area ranges from the tabula rum approach in [34] to the thoroughly 
prescribed [5]. Although Ariadne’s initial knowledge about what to learn and how to 
learn it is certainly engineered, conflicts among knowledge-based principles are left to 
the voting in tier 3, that is, no tier-3 Advisor is deliberately formulated to outweigh any 
other. 
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A second way to characterize an approach to learning navigation for a robot is by the 
degree to which it reflects what is known about human perception and behavior. PLAN 
is a connectionist model that integrates path finding into general cognition [5]. PLAN 
learns a topological map of experienced landmarks, a route map of place sequences 
and directions between them, and a survey map of global information. All three maps 
are based on a visual scene rather than an aerial view. The resultant system has strong 
biases to human sensory orientation (particularly in its refusal to see more than 180” 
about its position) and limited short-term memory, neither of which is necessary for 
intelligent robot navigation. The authors claim that such maps are therefore based on 
experience, but the experience they record is pure1 y visual or rote experience. In contrast, 
Ariadne retains knowledge that represents both momentary experience (e.g., a gate) 
and reasoning about a sequence of experiences (e.g.. a base). Although developed 
independently, some of PLAN’s features are quite similar to Ariadne’s: its gateways are 
similar to Ariadne’s gates, its regions similar to Ariadne’s bottles and chambers. PLAN 
makes its global overview explicit, and plans hierarchically from regional maps. PLAN’s 
expertise, however, appears to be in maps whose scale and level of difficulty are far 
below those Ariadne traverses with ease, and the authors offer no statistics on either its 
efficiency or its effectiveness. 
A third way to characterize an approach to learning navigation for a robot is by 
its representation of its world. Hayes has constructed a rigorous approach to reasoning 
about space [ 2 11. He too envisions representations of space into pieces (like Ariadne’s 
bottles, chambers, and quadrants) that have boundaries and connectors (like Ariadne’s 
bottlenecks, access points, and gates). There is, as yet, no implemented version, however. 
TOUR [ 271 and Qualnav [ 281 have landmarks that are sensorily distinctive. Ariadne’s 
grid world, as originally postulated by Korf, did not provide such landmarks. As a 
substitute, Ariadne has gates and bases predicated upon theories about what might 
be useful in travel. Ariadne does not store routes or route fragments from completed 
problems either, whereas TOUR and PLAN both keep a topological network of routes 
between places that can be manipulated to find a path. Unlike these systems, Ariadne’s 
global overview is implicit in the useful knowledge it learns; it plans naively and 
opportunistically. Although it would be simple enough to learn a route-fragment graph 
on Ariadne’s gates and bases, the reactive approach described here is preferred, for both 
its computational efficiency and its limited storage. 
SSH (Spatial Semantic Hierarchy) is a four-level ontological hierarchy to provide 
spatial knowledge for real-world robots [ 26 I. Ariadne’s features lie primarily at SSH’s 
topological level as learned places (e.g., gates and bases) and regions (e.g., bottles 
and chambers). Kuipers envisions this level as a representation for exploration and 
path-finding problems. Ariadne is thus complementary to his work. 
There has been some work on learning heuristics for problem solving. Lenat’s Eu- 
risko sought transformations of existing heuristics to find new, useful ones [ 301. Such 
an approach affords access only to interesting concepts linked to others by some at- 
tractive path of available transformations. Since transformation is a syntactic process, 
this approach does best when the representation in some way reflects the semantic 
content of the concepts, as it did in AM [29] but less so in some of the domains 
Eurisko addressed. Prieditis’ Absolver II sought an abstraction of a problem that could 
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be sped up and then used as an admissible heuristic [35]. Absolver II removed de- 
tails from the problem description in a variety of grammatical transformations that 
also required a good problem representation. The heuristics it learned were intended 
to prune search, but to be used one at a time. One of the problems Absolver II ad- 
dressed was a “Rooms World” problem for which it computed a heuristic that mini- 
mized the number of rooms a robot visited in the course of a box moving task. This 
is analogous to entering chambers only when necessary, for which Ariadne relies on 
Chamberlain and Outta Here. In contrast, Ariadne’s heuristics are for the most part 
prespecihed, although the information on which they rely is gathered during problem 
solving. Although this makes them applicable to a variety of problems and problem 
classes, it also makes them vulnerable to incorrect generalizations induced from experi- 
ence. 
Finally, although optimum paths in space have a variety of well-documented algo- 
rithms [ 411, they eventually face the 0( n2) complexity that comes from the underlying 
graph among the IZ points in the space. If Ariadne were to construct a map based on 
its heuristic knowledge, search there would be 0(n2) too. Instead, Ariadne employs the 
kind of spatial descriptions of experience people formulate in a satisficing approach to 
subvert that cost. The 24 Advisors in tiers 1 and 3 must react to a finite set of at most 
2r1- 1 legal moves and the available useful knowledge u within some fixed time t. The 
8 Advisors in tier 2 spend at most some finite time t’ in search. For a problem with a 
solution step limit 1, this means that Ariadne spends at most 1(24(2n - 1)~ + 8t’) time 
in search of a solution. The key is to control U, that is, to keep the cost of referenc- 
ing useful knowledge (facilitators and obstructors) sublinear. The result is occasionally 
optimal, and usually quite good, performance. 
8. Conclusion 
Human navigators react quickly and correctly to clearly productive or unhelpful oppor- 
tunities, such as “there’s the goal” or “not that dead-end again”. They entertain a variety 
of heuristics, such as “closer is better” or “when far away, take a long, straight step”. 
They also digress into a search mode tailored for a particular situation, for example, 
“this obstacle is between me and the goal, so I have to get around it”. 
Ariadne is an implemented pragmatic navigation system that epitomizes this kind 
of naive geographic reasoning, as if it were learning the way around a new campus 
or town. Ariadne learns a variety of features about a new environment, and uses that 
knowledge to solve multiple travel tasks there. Ariadne solves multiple problems in 
the same territory. It solves the easier ones in fewer steps and with fewer resources 
than more difficult problems. Compared to traditional search techniques, it solves these 
problems quickly, as measured in elapsed problem-solving time, number of decisions, 
and path length. It also performs efficiently, as measured by number of distinct locations 
visited and the percentage of repeated locations in a path. And Ariadne learns, so that 
it applies previous experience to hitherto unseen problems, both in random mazes and 
in a variety of more realistic world models. Ariadne does some primitive planning, and 
controls the allocation of search resources to acquire knowledge. 
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Pragmatic navigation as detailed here was shaped by an underlying architecture, 
FORR, a robust, adaptive integration of reactivity, heuristics, and search. Instead of a 
detailed map, pragmatic navigation represents the world as a collection of probably 
correct, possibly useful features. Instead of a uniform learning technique, each feature 
has one or more learning methods to acquire territory-specific instances of it. Instead 
of executing a long-range plan, pragmatic navigation selects one reasonable part of 
a journey at a time. Instead of planning with heavy search costs in a fine-grained 
representation, pragmatic navigation opportunistically constructs naive plans that suggest, 
rather than mandate, path selection. Despite the heuristic nature of Ariadne’s knowledge 
and decision making, empirical results demonstrate that, after relatively few learning 
tasks, Ariadne is able to solve novel, difficult problems quickly. 
Ariadne’s clear ability to outperform ablated versions of itself demonstrates that no 
subset of FORR’s reasoning methods suffices in this domain. Reactivity, heuristics, learn- 
ing, planning, and time-limited search based on situation recognition are each essential 
to good performance, and FORR connects them all in an appropriate manner. This paper 
advocates pragmatic navigation as a satislicing, cognitively plausible, developmental ap- 
proach to path finding. Ariadne demonstrates that such an approach is viable, efficient, 
robust, and applicable to a broad range of environments. 
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Appendix A. Ariadne’s Advisors by tier 
A.I. Tier I 
Advisors appear in the order in which they are consulted. 
Victory has absolute authority; if the goal is reachable by a legal move, Victory 
makes it. 
Curz Do forces a move to a location vertically or horizontally adjacent to the goal. 
On the next decision cycle, Victory will turn toward the goal and reach it. 
No Way vetoes unnecessary moves into a dead-end. This Advisor checks each legal 
move to see if it resides in the extent of a dead-end that could not contain the goal. 
(Recall that the extent is a bounding rectangle, so this is a conservative approach.) If 
so, No Way eliminates the move from further consideration by any other Advisor, unless 
the robot is already in the dead-end and therefore needs to get out. 
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Fig. A. I. Roundabout circumnavigates an obstruction. 
Pipeline vetoes a move to any location within a pipe if the location beyond the 
opposite exit is in view, unless the robot is in the pipe or the location is aligned with 
the goal. For example, in Fig. 6 (see p. 285) from ( 14,9) Pipeline would veto moves 
to ( 14, IO) and ( 14, 1 I); if traveling east efficiently, one would go through that pipe, 
not pause within it. 
A.2. Tier 2 
Advisors are discussed in the order in which they are consulted. 
Roundabout is a tier-2 Advisor that attempts to circumnavigate an obstruction between 
the robot and the goal. It triggers when the robot is in the same row or column 
as the goal but there is an intervening obstruction. When the robot is so aligned, 
Roundabout attempts to go around the obstruction between it and the goal. When, for 
example, Ariadne faced the situation in Fig. A.], Roundabout took the robot around 
the intervening horizontal obstruction before stopping at (2, 10) where the goal was in 
sight. Roundabout is not a traditional wall-following algorithm; it establishes a primary 
direction (toward the goal) and a secondary direction (orthogonal to the primary and 
not toward a barrier between the robot and the goal). In Fig. A. 1, the primary direction 
was north and the secondary direction was east. Avoiding known dead-ends, such as 
((4,9) (5,9) (5,8)) in Fig. A. I, search repeatedly moves toward the goal, in the primary 
direction when possible, otherwise in the secondary direction or their opposites until the 
goal is in view or until backup (permitted opposite to the primary and secondary 
directions) would exceed the original alignment coordinates. While time permits, if this 
search fails to produce a solution fragment, the algorithm will shift the robot laterally, 
first in the secondary direction, then in the opposite of the secondary direction, and 
attempt to circumnavigate from there. Although it iterates with increasingly large shifts 
until it succeeds, Roundabout is time-limited and heuristic like any tier-2 Advisor. Its 
search may fail to circumnavigate the obstruction, perhaps getting closer to the goal 
than it had been when it started but without actually bringing the goal into sight. All of 
Roundabout’s starch paths, successful or not, serve as input for barrier learning. 
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Fig. A2 Patchwork repairs a plan 
Outta Here is a tier-2 Advisor that attempts to leave a chamber or dead-end if it does 
not contain the goal. Outta Here triggers when the task is well underway and either 
the robot’s recent locations cover a relatively small fraction of the total area of the 
maze or Ariadne believes the robot to be in a dead-end or chamber not containing the 
goal. If the robot is in a dead-end, Outta Here marches out with a sequence of steps 
that lead through its exit. If the robot is in a chamber, Outta Here scans the way the 
chamber-learning routine does (and may learn a chamber as a side-effect) before it 
returns a sequence of up to three steps that move the robot out through the access point 
of the chamber. If Outta Here were to trigger in Fig. 7(a) (see p. 287) when the robot 
was at (2, 12), it could generate the path ((4, 12) (4, 13) (10, 13)). Outta Here is not 
guaranteed to find an access point, however, and may return the robot to a location it 
has already visited during the current task. 
Probe is a tier-2 Advisor that determines the extent of the robot’s confinement and then 
attempts to leave that space. Its trigger is the learning condition described for chambers. 
Probe scans to improve the view, that is, it tries to move the robot to an access point 
for the current chamber and then orthogonally leave the chamber. Chambers are learned 
during these scans as a side-effect of this search. From (4,12) in Fig. 7(a), depending 
upon its recent experience, Probe actually generated a path out and thereby learned the 
chamber shown. Probe is not guaranteed to learn a chamber. 
Patchwork is a tier-2 Advisor that attempts to repair a current plan with the same 
circumnavigation routine as Roundabout, if the plan fails because of an obstruction. 
Fig. A.2 shows a typical Patchwork plan that naively disregards the obstruction at 
(5, 10). When Patchwork triggered in Fig. A.2, it repaired the indicated plan by inserting 
the fragment ((4,1 I) (4, 12) (5,12) (5,13) (6,13) (7,13)) to move from (4, IO) to 
(7, 10). Patchwork triggers when there are valid current plans and 30% of the expected 
number of decisions has been exhausted. This prevents premature, overly elaborate 
solutions when simpler approaches would suffice. When Patchwork succeeds in repairing 
one step in a plan and the result contains at least one location new during this task, 
Patchwork forces that fragment, that is, it executes all the initial steps of the plan that 
need no correction, one circumnavigation sequence as a patch, and the next set of steps 
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Fig. A.3. Other Side shifts the robot’s orientation to the goal. 
that need no correction. In this way Patchwork moved the robot in Fig. A.2 directly to 
the goal. 
Other Side is a tier-2 Advisor that attempts to shift the robot from one side of the 
goal to the other. In decision cycles, Other Side is costly, so its trigger describes an 
appropriate but also fairly desperate state. Other Side triggers when it is late, there 
are no current plans, the other side of the goal is within the edges of the maze, the 
current location is not the result of a just-executed fragment, the robot has been in 
this location before, and throughout the task the robot has been on one side (left, 
right, above, or below) of the goal. Other Side then attempts to move the robot to 
the other side (right, left, below, or above, respectively) of the goal. An example of 
an Other Side path appears in Fig. A.3, from an early learning task on this maze. 
The robot began the task at (9, 12) and kept trying to penetrate the irregular barrier 
running north-south to reach the goal. When Other Side finally triggered, the robot was 
at ( 11,9) and had always been to the right of the goal. Other Side will abandon its 
directional attempt if the goal comes into view, as it did from (12,2). If, for example, 
the goal had been at (4,2) instead, Other Side’s path would have gone from (12,2) 
to ( I 1,2) then halted at ( I I, 1) to the left of the goal instead, still a constructive 
contribution. 
Super Qua&w is a tier-2 Advisor that attempts to change the robot’s quadrant. It 
triggers when the task is well underway and the robot has been in its current quadrant 
(or its current quadrant and the goal’s quadrant) for some time. Super-Quadro scans 
to find a move into the extent of a gate that would change the robot’s quadrant. It 
tries to find a sequence of orthogonal steps to a location whose quadrant is different, 
preferably the goal quadrant if it has not been there recently. From (5,5) in Fig. A.4, 
taken from an early learning task where Ariadne had not yet found its way to the goal 
through (2,4), Super Quadro generated the path (( 5,6) (5,ll)). This takes the robot 
into the goal’s quadrant, but cannot lead it to the goal. (Ariadne eventually found the 
right solution.) Super Quadro has no heuristics for preferring one gate to another (since 
that would require even further search), so its solution fragments, like this one, may not 
always be constructive. 
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Fig. A.4. Super Quadro responds to its trigger. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 1011 121314 
Kev 
obstruction 
- Wander’s path 
Fig. A.S. A situation that triggered Wander. 
Wander is a tier-2 Advisor that attempts to find an L-shaped path that leads it to a 
new location, one as far from the robot’s current location as possible. Wander triggers 
only when the robot’s behavior is judged constrained and repetitive, and the current 
location was not just the result of a solution fragment. Wandering becomes less likely 
as more bases are identified; its trigger is therefore stochastic, with probability 
I- 
[bases/ 
0. I /unobstructed maze locations/ 
Wander tests up to eight L-shaped paths that are pairs of longest possible steps in two 
orthogonal directions. As a side-effect, Wander learns dead-ends on the first leg of the 
L. On the second leg of the L, it does not pass a location that would align the robot 
with the goal unless the robot has already visited that location during this task, nor 
does it move toward a barrier between it and the goal. Wander often produces several 
solution fragments but, like any tier-2 Advisor, it can only recommend one. It prefers 
to recommend one in the direction of the goal that ends in a location farthest from the 
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Fig. A .6. Part of a Humpty Dumpty path and the barrier learned from it. 
1234 567 8910 
Kev 
obstruction 
- path 
- barrier 
R robot 
robot’s current location, has been rarely visited, and has not been visited recently. When 
Wander triggered in Fig. A.5, the robot had begun at (8,2) and made little progress. 
Now Wander forced the path (( 10,5) ( 14,5)). Wander is the least reliable of the tier-2 
Advisors, but it often makes a dramatic impact when one is sorely needed. 
Humpty Dumpty is a tier-2 Advisor that goes in search of barriers, hindrances that 
might be avoided by judicious move selection. It triggers if the robot has been to most 
of the locations available through the current legal moves and there are few known 
barriers in its vicinity. The fragment Humpty Dumpty returns is one that traverses the 
immediate area along contiguous obstructions. It has the least goal-directed algorithm 
in tier 2, but the data it collects serves as important input to several other Advi- 
sors. A Humpty Dumpty path fragment and the barrier extracted from it appear in 
Fig. A.6 
A.3. Tier 3 
Advisors in tier 3 are consulted simultaneously. Their order of presentation here is 
only to facilitate discussion. 
Goal Row and Goal Column attempt to align the robot with the goal. Goal Column 
favors moves that align the robot vertically with the goal only if it is not already; Goal 
Row favors moves that do so horizontally. Giant Step and Plod advocate large and small 
steps, respectively. Late in a task, Hurry proportionately encourages those moves with 
the five longest steps. When the robot has recently been confined to a small area, Giant 
Step encourages the five longest moves with proportionate strengths. Plod advocates 
single unit moves, more strongly (with a higher comment strength) for those toward 
the goal and when the robot is close to G. 
Mr. Rogers and Contract address the Euclidean distance to the goal. Mr. Rogers 
supports, with strengths proportional to their result, moves into the goal’s neighborhood, 
that is, those that produce the shortest distances to the goal. Contract, on the other hand, 
advocates large steps when the robot is far from the goal, and small steps when the 
robot is close to it. Closeness is measured relative to the maze’s diagonal, its maximum 
possible distance. Both Advisors address proximity, but Mr. Rogers seeks to be close 
to the goal, while Contract uses proximity to determine step size, whether or not those 
steps draw the robot closet- to the goal. 
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Been There, Done That, Cycle Breaker, and Adventure all address prior behavior 
during the current task. Been There discourages returning to a location already visited 
during this task, with more discouragement (a lower comment strength) for more 
frequently visited locations. With careful representation, such Advisors can respond 
as if they were reactive. One way to make Been There reactive, for example, would 
be to note locations already visited in the current task in an array and “sense” there. 
Done That discourages moving in the same direction one did before from a previously 
visited location. When the robot repeatedly visits the same few spots in its most recent 
moves, Cycle Breaker attempts to intervene by suggesting an alternative that, while 
not necessarily new, is novel in the current context. Adventure, in contrast, encourages 
innovation. Adverlture recommends moves to locations thus far unvisited during this 
task, with greater strengths for those in the direction of the goal. 
C/zunzber/uin discourages a move into the extent of a chamber if the goal is not there, 
and encourages such a move if the goal might be there. If the robot is already in a 
chamber where the goal is not, Chamberlain encourages moves to its access point (to 
support a subsequent exit). Chamberlain is less powerful than Probe because it does not 
search and can only recommend a single move. Cork is the tier-3 version of Chamberlain 
for bottles. Any location from which a bottle’s neck can be seen provides an exit from 
the bottle. When the robot is outside the bottle, Chamberlain discourages moves into a 
bottle whose extent indicates that it cannot contain the goal, and encourages moves into 
the neck of a bottle or into the bottle itself whose extent indicates that it can contain 
the goal. When the robot is inside the bottle, Cork reverses this advice. 
Detour avoids moving toward barriers that lie directly between a location and the 
goal. Jf a barrier already intervenes, Detour encourages moves to avoid it. 
Quadra is a simpler version of Super Quadro. It encourages, with decreasing strengths, 
moves to known gates into the goal’s quadrant, moves into the extent of a known gate 
into the goal’s quadrant, moves to known gates into another quadrant, and moves into 
the extent of a known gate into another quadrant. 
Home Run and Leap Frog both use bases. Home Run encourages moves to bases and, 
with lesser strengths, moves to locations next to bases. Leap Frog advocates a move to 
the legal location closest to the end of any current plan. 
Corner advocates a move to the far exit of a pipe that turns, more strongly when 
the pipe is in the direction of the goal, less so when it is opposite the direction of the 
goal. Crook advocates a move to the near exit of a corridor that is neither straight nor a 
dead-end, again more strongly when the corridor is in the direction of the goal, less so 
when the far exit of the corridor is opposite the direction of the goal. 
Opening encourages the reuse of previously successful path beginnings when appli- 
cable. Although such moves may seem odd if the goal is in a different location, the 
heuristic works well if the old path was successful because it began by moving to an 
area that offered good access to other parts of the maze. 
A.4. Parameters for Advisor applicabilit!~ 
One common component of the triggers for tier-2 Advisors is a measure of lateness 
relative to available resources. Each task in a FORR-based system can be terminated if 
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the decision limit is met or the computation time allocated to a problem is exhausted. 
Depending upon the trigger, lateness may be measured as the number of actual moves 
in the partial solution, the percentage of the decision limit or computation time thus 
far exhausted (whether or not it resulted in moves), or the ratio of actual moves to 
the average task length. The following parameters were applied during the experiments 
described here: 
l Giant Step: The most recent 30% of the history is confined to no more than 10% 
of the maze area. 
l Humpty Dumpty: The most recent 30% of the history includes at least 80% of the 
legal actions, there are fewer than 3 known walls in the robot’s vicinity, and 50% 
of the decision limit has been exhausted. 
l Opening: The first 15% of the moves constitute the opening. 
l Other Side: 60% of the decision limit has been exhausted. 
l Outta Here: The most recent 30% of the history is confined to no more than 10% 
of the maze area. 
l Wander: The most recent 30% of the history is confined to no more than 10% of 
the maze area. 
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